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ABSTRACT 
CREATIVITY AND LINGUISTIC THEORY  
The notion of creativity has been used by 
many theorists to describe that aspect of language which 
enables a language user to use language in a novel way 
or to devise new forms of language. 	Chomsky especially 
uses the "creative aspect of language use" to describe 
the innovative uses of language. 
This study explores the notion of creativity 
in linguistic theory. 	An examination is made of its 
application by Chomsky, from his earliest work on. 
At least two different notions are distinguishable: 
rule-governed creativity and rule-changing creativity. 
The former is shown to be a formal property of the 
syntactic system and creative in a mechanical sense only. 
The latter is an aspect of the semantic system, but is 
left largely unexplored by Chomsky. 
An assessment is made of comments by other 
theorists on the notion of creativity and these are 
related to the Chomskian analysis, 	The distinction between 
rule-governed and rule-changing creativity is confirmed. 
Den Ouden (1975) is criticised in some detail as a 
superficial treatment of the topic. 	The semantic nature 
of creativity in language is confirmed. 
The theory of metaphor is treated as an example 
of creativity in language. 	Metaphor is clearly a 
meaning-based language device and has traditionally been 
described as a creative mechanism. 	The range of metaphor 
theories is reviewed and a synthesis is attempted, based 
on the Mooij (1976) model, with some assistance from 
Ricoeur (1978). 
The psycho-linguistic literature on metaphor 
is reviewed in the light of this model, and a working 
description derived, based on Ortony's (1979) concept 
of non-literal similarity. 	This description implies 
that there exists a capacity in language to move beyond 
the literal rules of syntax and semantics, as described 
in standard linguistic theory, and still produce a 
comprehensible utterance. 
Therefore, the existing models of language are 
based on rules of syntax and semantics which are too 
restrictive, and there may exist a supra syntactic-semantic 
device which enables comprehension of syntactically or 
semantically anomalous utterances. 	This is the creative 
capacity of language. 
J.. J. 
The work of De Beaugrande is considered as 
an attempt to build this creative capacity into the 
formal description of language. 	Language is characterised 
as an intersystem in which various systems of rules and 
elements interact. 	This interaction produces meaning- 
bearing texts. 	The rules and elements are subject to 
modification; only the meaning function of the text is 
immutable. 	Creativity, then, is the formal capacity for 
intersystem modification. 
1. INTRODUCTION.  
The scientific study of language is, in part, 
an attempt to sort fact from belief. 	Linguists are 
never fully successful in this enterprise for they bring 
to their scholarship a host of assumptions, not all of 
which are exorcised by the rigour of their methodologies. 
The present study is an attempt to face one of 
the assumptions which linguists frequently make about 
the nature of language. 	The creativity of language is 
a broad and undefined description of an aspect of 
language to which many linguists have paid homage. 
Max Black (1968) has described this aspect of 
language in the following way: 
"Users of language are free to invent new words, 
to invest old words with new meanings, to modify 
established syntactical patterns, to use the 
rhetorical devices of metaphor and irony, and to 
modify the stereotyped and routine ideas crystallized 
in the linguistic system 	For all its fixity 
of structure at any given time, a living language 
has an inherent plasticity and capacity for growth 
and adaptation" 	(p.65) 
The significance of this description is the 
concern of the present study, 
The importance attached to the notion of 
the creativity of language varies widely, as does the 
part it plays in various theories of language. Along 
with Chomsky, many have relegated it to the fuzzy edges 
of linguistic theory, whilst acknowledging the phrase 
and, implicitly, the language mechanism it points to. 
The aim of the present study is to make explicit 
the notion of the creativity of language. 	Unless we are 
able to accurately describe the notion, it ought to be 
laid aside. 	In fact it may be meaningless, but at least 
let us make that clear. 
There is no pressing reason, however, to believe 
that the notion is meaningless. 	Certainly, its presence 
in linguistic discussion testifies to the strong possibility 
that the creativity of language is an essential, yet 
undefined, aspect of language. 	It seems worthy of further 
investigation. 
The present investigation has been structured 
in a particular way. 	Noam Chomsky has been, and is, 
a crucial figure in linguistic study in this century. 
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He has made a monumental contribution to the theory of 
language. 	From his first public contribution (Chomsky, 
1957), he has acknowledged the creative aspect of 
language use. 	In addition, he has used the word 
creativity' to describe various formal properties of 
the structure of language. 	It seems appropriate to 
commence the investigation with the contribution made 
by Chomsky. 	This is the concern of Chapter Two, 
There are other linguists who have made comment 
on the notion of creativity. 	In fact, most theorists of 
language have used the concept, although, of course, they 
have done so in many different ways and for different 
reasons. 	For instance, the contribution of Den Ouden has 
centred on the notion of creativity. 	These various 
contributions are discussed in Chapter Three. 
Creativity in language has often been taken to 
relate intimately to the capacity of language to mean. 
Novel ways of meaning have often been described as 
creative and probably the most significant example of 
/ this is figurative language. 	One figure in particular, 
-metaphor, has traditionally been linked to creativity in 
expression. 	For this reason, it seems appropriate to 
explore precisely what metaphor is. 	This is the topic of 
Chapter Four, 
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How does metaphor relate to language and, 
specifically, how does it relate to the creativity of 
language? 	This is cUscussed LnChapter Five. 
Finally, what does the notion of creativity 
in language mean? 	In what sense is language creative 
and how can this notion be formalised and incorporated 
into the description of language? 	How does the formal 
description of language change in the light of the 
creative capacity of language? 	These questions are 
confronted in Chapter Six. 
This study is an investigation and a discussion. 
Although much is explored, only modest discoveries are 
claimed. 	However, if the exploration has contributed 
to bringing the creative capacity of language from the 
shadows of linguistic study, then the underlying purpose 
of the study has been achieved. 
4 
2. THE CREATIVE ASPECT OF LANGUAGE. 
The earliest references by Chomsky to the 
"creative aspect of language" occur in the first chapter 
of Current Issues in Linguistic Theory (1964) Chamsky refers to 
what he describes as the "central fact", with which any 
theory of language must concern itself: 
"A mature speaker can produce a new sentence 
of his language on the appropriate occasion, and other 
speakers can understand it immediately, though it is 
equally new to them. 	Most of our linguistic experience, 
both as speakers and hearers, is with new sentences; once 
we have mastered a language, the class of sentences with 
which we can operate fluently and without difficulty or 
hesitation is so vast that for all practical purposes 
(and obviously, for all theoretical purposes) we may 
regard it as infinite" 	(13.7). 
This encapsulates two concepts to which Chomsky 
will return. 	The first may be called the infinity 
principle of language; it suggests that any language 
is capable of producing an infinite number of sentences. 
The argument is here confined to sentences and implies 
that "new" means different v fram any other entence-in-the 
combination of sentence elements, 	This concept belongs 
to the competence of a user of language b in the sense 
that it is a part of what the language is capable of 
doing. It is a formal property of a grammar. 
The second concept relates to the performance of a 
user of language in that a speaker can produce a particular 
sentence which is different from all other sentences 
which he or anyone else has ever produced. 	This is an 
empirical fact since it is capable of falsification. 
It is also the evidence which leads to the postulation 
that language is, in fact, capable of repeating this 
particular performance (the production of a new sentence) 
infinitely. 	But this postulation (that is, the infinity 
aspect of language) depends for its strength upon a theory 
of language, rather than upon a single empirical fact. 
Chomsky follows the establishment of this central 
fact by pointing out a long tradition of argumentation 
which refers to the "creative aspect of language". 
He notes that Descartes and Cordemoy relied upon language 
and its creative aspect as crucial evidence for their 
theory that man, and man alone, can be distinguished 
from all other animals, thus pronouncing man unique in the 
world as a being not programmed to live within the strictures 
of a pre-determined "nature", but possessing a creative freedom. 
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Chomsky continues his historical investigation 
of how the notion of "creativity" was treated by commenting 
upon two traditions of nineteenth-century linguistics. 
The Cartesian tradition was carried to its greatest height 
with von Humboldt, whilst the rise of the empiricist (or 
the "taxonomic-behaviourist" - p.25) tradition is linked 
to Whitney and de Saussure. 	Both traditions are criticised 
by Chomsky for not clarifying their use of creativity, 
particularly in failing to distinguish between "rule-governed 
creativity" and "rule-changing creativity". 	Chomsky 
describes the former as: 
"the kind of 'creativity' that leaves the language 
entirely unchanged (as in the production - and 
understanding - of new sentences, an activity in 
which the adult is constantly engaged)". (p. 22); 
and the latter as: 
"the kind that actually changes the set of 
grammatical rules (e.g. analogic change)" (p.22). 
He suggests that this distinction is fundamental s and that 
it is only since the application of logic and mathematics 
to linguistics that the conceptual tools for dealing with 
rule-governed creativity have been available. 	In other 
words, the distinction could not be drawn until generative 
grammar had produced the viewpoint that language is 
/essentially a rule-governed activity. 
It is evident that Chomsky has somewhat 
expanded the original notion of the creative aspect of 
language. 	It has now been classified into rule-governed 
creativity and rule-changing creativity. 	Rule-governed 
creativity includes the empirical fact of the production 
of new sentences and the theoretical fact of the 
infinite ability of language to produce new sentences. 
However, it must be noted that Chomsky frequently 
intends only rule-governed creativity when he uses the 
phrase "the creative aspect of language". 	He does not 
delve much further into rule-changing creativity, and 
his final reference to the issue in Current Issues reinforces 
the view that he is really concerned only with rule-governed 
creativity: 
"the 'creative' aspect of language use 	is the 
ability to form and understand previously unheard 
sentences" (p.111). 
In Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), Chomsky 
confirms the approach he had taken in earlier work, that is, 
to consider the creative aspect of language use as an a priori 
principle, inherent in the grammar of a language and used 
by the speaker almost constantly. 	It is becoming a 
philosophical statement, repeated constantly and invariably 
through the use of the phrase "creative aspect of 
language use", described as a fundamental fact of language 
but largely left unexplained. 	It is "there"; the theory 
acknowledges it but does little more than that. 
In Aspects, Chomsky adds a new description to 
the creative aspect of language, borrowed explicitly from 
von Humboldt: 
"His view is that a. language 'makes infinite use of 
finite means' and that its grammar must describe 
the processes that make this possible" (p.v.). 
Again, the description refers only to the formal property 
of grammar (i.e. it is rule-governed creativity). 
In his introductory comments Chomsky refers again 
to the Cartesian tradition of philosophical grammar 
"It was clearly understood that one of the qualities 
that all languages have in common is their 'creative' 
aspect. 	Thus, an essential property of language is 
that it provides the means for expressing indefinitely 
many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in an 
indefinite range of new situations" (p.6). . 
Although this is largely a restatement of the earlier position, 
it does make explicit that this quality of creativity is part 
of universal grammar. 
Chomsky is well aware of the limitations of 
philosophical grammar and, despite the insights the 
tradition provided, the lack of the technical descriptions 
which mathematics brought to linguistics,, prevented it 
from detailing these insights: 
"Although it was well understood that linguistic 
processes are in some sense 'creative', the technical 
devices for expressing a system of recursive processes 
were simply not available until much more recently. 
In fact, a real understanding of how a language can 
(in Humboldt's words) 'make infinite use of finite 
means' has developed only within the last thirty 
years.... [Now we are able] to attempt an explicit 
formulation of the 'creative' processes of language" 
(p.8). 
It is apparent that creativity is here being 
limited yet further to the formal property of a grammar 
(through universal grammar) to create new combinations out 
of existing components through such devices as recursive 
loops. 	It is equally apparent from Aspects that no such 
"explicit formulation" was attempted. 
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The Cartesian tradition of philosophical 
grammar is more fully explored in Cartesian Linguistics (1966). 
In this essay Chomsky devotes a chapter to the creative 
aspect of language use. 	It is to be expected that the 
arguments presented relate largely to philosophical 
insights rather than to linguistic hypotheees1 but Chomsky 
admits that his concern is to discover what these philosophers 
said about language and how it compares to the theoretical 
foundations of generative grammar. 	In other words, it is 
a retrospective rediscovery of some of his own postulates. 
Firstly, Chomsky quotes Descartes' arguments 
regarding language as the essential difference between man 
and animal, or between man and any mechanistic creature 
such as an automaton. 	The concern is to demonstate the 
uniqueness of man, and the assumption that all lower orders 
can be thought of as mechanistic is left implicit. 
For Descartes, the ability to produce a new 
sentence, appropriate to the situation, is - unique to man. 
It is: 
"a species-specific capacity, a unique type of 
intellectual organisation which cannot be attributed 
to peripheral organs or related to general intelligence 
and which manifests itself in what we may refer to as 
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the 'creative aspect' of ordinary language use - 
its property being both unbounded in scope and 
stimulus free" (p.5) 
Although these are Chomsky's words, it is 
difficult to judge to what extent he supports the Cartesian 
view summarised herein. 	The question of whether language 
is unique to man will be addressed later (see Chapter Three), 
but Chomsky has certainly supported this view vigorously 
(1980, p.239-241). 	The secondary argument that language 
is in its essential characteristics qualitatively different 
from other communication systems is also strongly defended 
by Chomsky (p.77, n.8). 	However, "unbounded 
in scope" and "stimulus-free" are clearly Chomsky's words 
and do require comment. 	This is apparently felt by Chomsky 
since he expands on their use in a footnote of some length 
(p.77, n.8). 
He first makes the point that the two properties 
are independent of each other: 
"An automaton may have only two responses that are 
produced randomly. A tape recorder 	has an unbounded 
output that is not stimulus-free in the intended sense. 
Animal behaviour is typically regarded by the Cartesians 
as unbounded, but not stiumulus-free, and hence not 
creative' in the sense of human speech" (p.77). 
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Chomsky then suggests that animal communication 
systems are both bounded and stimulus-dependent, emphasizing 
especially its limitations in having a fixed signal 
for a given situation. 	This can be manifested either 
through a fixed range of signals directly associated with 
a range of external conditions or internal states, or 
through a fixed range of 'linguistic dimensions', each one 
of which is directly linked to a non-linguistic dimension. 
This distinction is not entirely clear, 
Chomsky returns to the Cartesian argument and 
suggests that given the creative aspect of language use, 
and the impossibility of a mechanistic explanation for it, 
Descartes concluded that an entirely new substance had to 
exist, distinct from the body, which could incorporate this 
creative principle. 	This substance Descartes called mind 
and its essence is thought. 	It is mind which accounts for 
human reason and the great variety in thoughts and behaviour of 
which each human is capable. 	Therefore, such display of 
thoughts, through language, and behaviour, was sufficient 
proof of other minds. 
Cordemoy is discussed by Chomsky as the philosopher 
who made more explicit the theory of language inherent in 
Cartesian philosophy. 	Cordemoy, firstly, confined the 
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evidence for the existence of other minds to innovative 
speech since the physical evidence for language can be 
produced mechanically. 	It is novel utterances in novel 
situations yielding coherent discourse which constitutes 
evidence that the other body has a mind. 
Chomsky refers to at least three of Cordemoy's 
experiments for determining whether the other is capable 
of producing novel utterances. 
"Moreover, I see, I can agree with some (i.e. other 
Bodied 	that what commonly signifies one thing, 
shall signifie another, and that this succeeds so, as 
that there are none but those, with whom I have agreed 
about it, that appear to me to understand what I think " 
(p.8); 1 
and: 
"But yet, when I shall see, that those Bodies shall make 
signes, that shall have no respect at all to the state 
they are in, nor to .their conservation: when I shall see, 
that those signes shall agree with those which I shall have 
made to express my thoughts: When I shall see, that they 
shall give me Ideas, I had not before, and which shall 
1 Chomsky quotes the original French. 	The translation given 
here is from A Philosophical Discourse Concerning Speech (1668) 
by G. De Cordemoy, Scholars Facsimiles, Delmar, New York, 
1972. 
relate to the thing I had in mind: Lastly, when 
I shall see a great sequel between their signes and 
mine, I shall not be reasonable, if I believe not, 
that they are such, as I am " (p.8-9). 
For Cordemoy, it seemed obvious that such capacity 
for innovation was confined to man alone and that, therefore, 
language proved the uniqueness of man. 
Chomsky briefly refers to the comments of La Mettrie. 
Unfortunately, after describing La Mettrie's explanation of 
language as a more complex form of the simpler communication 
systems available to animals, Chomsky does not specifically 
counter the arguments they contain. 	For example, La Mettrie 
suggested that if motion is considered a property of matter, 
then it is no more difficult to consider thought a property 
of matter. 	If other abstract properties such as gravity 
and electricity are attributed to matter, then why not the 
abstract property of thought. 	Chomsky's only comment is an 
obscure footnote (n.18) stating that La Mettrie's method of 
explanation may be correct, but that it does not tackle the 
evidence offered by the creative aspect of language use. 
Chomsky refines his charge against La Mettrie (and 
incidentally much of modern psycholinguistic work which 
focuses on the communicational or functional aspect of 
language) by suggesting that the creative aspect of language 
use indicates that language is free from control by external 
stimuli or internal states. 	Therefore, it is able to serve 
as the means for thought and self-expression, rather than 
merely as a communicative device. 	Chomsky is to return 
insistently to this argument; for him language is 
quintessentially an expressive system that externalises 
in a creative way abstract mental states. 	It is only 
incidentally a method for communicating with others, and 
it is trivial to study this functional aspect of language. 
In quick succession, Chomsky then criticises Ryle 
for failing to realise the implications of "intelligent 
behaviour", Bloomfield for failing to come to grasp with the 
infinity principle, as well as Hockett, Paul, Saussure and 
Jespersen for arguing that the infinity principle can be 
accounted for by "analogy" or a similar principle. 	Chomsky 
denies that generalisation or analogy can account for what 
is produced in ordinary language use or for what a language 
user is capable of producing: 
"To attribute the creative aspect of 1anguage use to 
'analogy' or grammatical patterns is to use these terms 
in a completely metaphorical way, with no clear sense 
and with no relation to the technical usage of linguistic 
theory " (p.12). 
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Before moving on to consider later developments 
in the philosophical theories of language, Chomsky makes a 
brief reference to the notion of creativity itself (n.30): 
"One would not refer to an act as 'creative' simply 
on the basis of its novelty and independence of 
identifiable drives or stimuli. 	Hence, the term 
'creative aspect of language use' is not entirely 
appropriate, without qualification, as a designation 
for the property of ordinary language that concerned 
Descartes and Cordemoy " (p.84). 
This appears to suggest that Chomsky is again confining 
himself to rule-governed creativity. 	This is corroborated by 
his reference to 'ordinary language' which may be presumed to be 
opposed to unusual uses of languages such as the narrative or the 
poetic use of language; these are probablymorefamiliarly 
thought of as language which involves creativity. 	At any 
rate, it seems quite clear that Chomsky generally reserves 
his stock phrase "the creative aspect of language use" for 
the property of grammar previously described as the infinity 
principle. 
Chomsky traces the development of the Cartesian 
tradition of philosophical grammar through to the German 
Romantic tradition as exemplified by Herder and A.W. Schlegel. 
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Herder clarified the central Cartesian argument concerning 
the uniqueness of man to a dual principle: man possesses 
creative language and man is capable of diversity of 
behaviour. 	Like Descartes, Herder attributes these two 
capacities to man's central capacity for reason. 	Unlike 
Descartes, Herder attributes reason not to a faculty of 
the mind, but to the "freedom of stimulus control" (p.15). 
Chomsky suggests that this is quite similar to James Harris' 
notion of reason as freedom from instinct. 
Schlegel developed this Romantic concept of man 
into an explicit aesthetic theory. 	For him, language is 
more than a response to external stimuli; it has a capacity 
for abstraction and imagination which indicates its freedom 
from external or internal control. 	Chomsky states: 
"From this conception of language, it is only a short 
step to the association of the creative aspect of 
language use with true artistic creativity " (p.17). 
In general, language has a poetical quality_ even 
in its ordinary uses because it is independent from external 
stimuli and from practical ends. 	More specifically, Schlegel 
accords the expressive capacity of language (that is, its 
poetic capacity) a unique status amongst all forms of personal 
expression. S Language used in its highest expressive form 
(that is, poetry) is unique because it is concerned only with 
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ideas and it precedes all other forms of creative expression 
because the creative mental act precedes any work of art: 
"Thus the creative use of language which, under certain 
conditions, of form and organisation constitutes poetry, 
accompanies and underlies any act of the creative 
imagination no matter what the medium in which it is 
realized. 	In this way, poetry achieves its unique 
status among the arts, and artistic creativity is 
related to the creative aspect of language use" (p.18). 
The full potential of the Cartesian tradition of 
philosophical grammar was realised in the work of von Humboldt. 
Humboldt developed the notion that language had an underlying 
"form" which generated the actual utterances made by speakers. 
It is this generative principle which accounts for "the 
unbounded set of individual 'creative' acts that constitute 
normal language use (p.22), and: 
"Humboldt's insight that language is far more than 
'patterned' organisation of elements of various types and. 
that any adequate description of it must refer these 
elements to the finite system of generative principles 
which determine the individual linguistic elements 
and their inter-relations and which underlie the infinite 
variety of linguistic acts that can be meaningfully 
performed " (p.22). 
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The specific argument concerning the "form" 
of language, and the general one concerning "mechanical form" 
and "organic form", were of great metaphysical interest 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 	It can be 
traced in a variety of strains, but all originate from 
the debate concerning the nature of man. 	From this 
departure point it is possible to see many avenues of 
thought, but to mention two of them will suffice to 
illustrate the ubiquitous nature of the debate. 
Firstly, a perspective on human nature has 
political consequences, in that man's relation to other men 
and to the State can be compared according to the particular 
perspective selected. 	The tradition of concluding that a 
fundamental conflict is inherent in this relationship can - 
be seen as far back as political theory will allow; but one 
tradition follows the Cartesian theory of mind to von Humboldt 
and on to Marx, Sartre and Chomsky through his political 
writings, A conception of human nature is fundamental to 
the anarcho-libertarianist views which these thinkers hold 
in common. 
A , second example is based on a similar conception 
of human nature but takes the path of literary. theory, 
It may be seen to go from the Cartesian theory. of mind 
to the Romantic philosophers as exemplified by Schlegel, 
Herder and von Humboldt; it injected itself into the practice 
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of literature through such writers as Goethe and Coleridge. 
What is shared is a conception of man as an expressive 
creature whose essential nature demands to be externalised 
or realised through creative acts. 	Chomsky is satisfied 
to draw all these contributions under the wings of 
Cartesian philosophy. 
Chomsky analyses the 
specific contributions which von Humboldt makes to a 
generative theory of language as it concerns its creative 
capacity. 	For instance, he characterises a lexicon 
as not just a word-list, but rather a set of generative 
principles that allows for change and renewal to occur. 
Extending the possibilities for innovation inherent in 
such a dynamic conception of language, von Humboldt describes 
language as possessing a "character". 	Chomsky interprets 
this as follows: 
"the character of a language is determined by the 
manner in which it is used, in particular, in poetry 
and philosophy" (p.27); 
and: 
"Thus a great writer or thinker can modify the 
character of the language and enrich its means of 
expression without affecting its grammatical structure. 
The character of a language is closely related to 
other elements of the national character and is a 
highly individual creation. 	For von Humboldt, as 
for his Cartesian and romantic precursors, the normal 
use of language typically involves creative mental 
acts; but it is the character of a language rather 
than its form that reflects true "creativity" in a 
higher sense - in the sense that it implies value as 
well as novelty " (p.27). 
This appears to signal a return to the earlier 
notion of "rule-changing creativity" but it is unclear whether 
Chomsky echoes the reference made to modifying the character 
of a language without affecting its grammatical structure. 
His criticism of von Humboldt for being unclear suggests 
that he does not necessarily accept the particular description 
of "rule-changing creativity" which von Humboldt attempts 
through the use of the notion of "character": 
"His work is also marred by unclarity regarding several 
fundamental questions, in particular, regarding the 
distinction between the rule-governed creativity which 
constitutes the normal use of language and which does 
not modify the form of the language at all and the 
kind of innovation that leads to a modification in the 
grammatical structure of the language" (p.27-28). 
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From this point on, Chomsky returns to his 
stock use of language creativity as pertaining only to 
rule-governed creativity. 	It is intimately related to 
the remainder of the discussion in Cartesian Linguistics 
which considers the contribution of philosophical grammar 
to the concepts of deep and surface structure. 	Failure 
to consider the creative aspect of language use is levelled 
against the empiricists again and again, and yet it receives 
no amplification in what is admittedly a historical treatise. 
Chomsky's final comment to the topic at hand in 
Cartesian Linguistics is most instructive. 	He cites many of 
the previously mentioned thinkers as having to resort to 
inspiration from disembodied spirits in order to explain 
true creative thought. 	Chomsky concludes in a note (n.61): 
"(It) leaves quite open the question of how creative 
thought is possible, and the discussion of this matter 
was no more satisfactory than any account that can 
be given today - that is, it is left as a complete 
mystery " (p.95). 
In Problems of Knowledge and Freedom (1972), Chomsky 
is specifically concerned with the epistemological problem 
of the acquisition of knowledge. 	He provides an account 
which draws heavily upon his work in linguistics. 	However, 
in the course of defining his account of knowledge as the 
acquisition of rules, Chomsky acknowledges the limitation 
of this account: 
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"The rules in question are not laws of nature nor, 
of course, are they legislated or laid down by any 
authority. 	They are, if our theorising is correct, 
rules that are constructed by the mind in the course 
of acquisition of knowledge. 	They can be violated and, 
in fact, departure from the rules can often be an 
effective literary device " (p.33). 
This is followed by a discussion of the literary 
device of deviation from a strict grammatical rule. 
Chomsky quotes WilliamEmpson's "degree of logical or 
grammatical disorder" as a description of this literary 
device: 
"Deviation from strict grammatical rule is one device 
to force the reader to 'invent a variety of reasons 
and order them in his own mind' in seeking to determine 
the meaning of what is said - 'the essential fact about 
the poetical use of language', as Empson suggests, 
but a feature of normal usage as well, for similar 
reasons " (pp.33-34). • 
Clearly, Chomsky is referring here to rule-changing 
creativity; he adds the comment that not only is this 
undertaken for literary reasons through poetical usage, but 
also that this phenomenon occurs normally in the ordinary use 
of language. 	Chomsky does not continue with this exploration 
of such usage as it lies outside his immediate concern 
in Problems. 	However, many questions are raised by his 
statement that "We can often exploit the expressive 
resources of language most fully by departing from its 
principles " (p.33). 
This suggests that Chomsky is required to move 
beyond the idealised model of language to include what is 
an ordinary use of language. 	If the rules can be broken, 
and indeed are conmionly broken, in order to use a particular 
language, then this capacity has to be built into the model 
(or grammar) of that language. 	The point is that this 
rule-changing creativity belongs to the grammar and is not 
the result of factors relating to performance. 	The grammar, 
therefore, has to accommodate both rule-governed activity 
and rule-changing activity wherein the latter stands in a 
creative relationship to the former; linguistic creativity 
is a device for language change. 
Chomsky concludes his essay on the acquisition 
of knowledge by examining the restraints which a system of 
rule acquisition imposes upon man. 	He argues that it 
enhances the creative capacities of mind by giving the mind 
direction, quoting both Coleridge and Russell in support of 
this view. 	Thus, Chomsky returns to his basic position of 
seeing all creativity taking place within certain guidelines, 
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in this particular case, "the principles of mind which 
provide 	the scope as well as the limits of human 
creativity " (p.45). 
In Topics of the Theory of Generative Grammar (1966) 
Chomsky again refers to his fundamental notion of the 
creativity of language, again in slightly different words, 
but to the same end of criticising those models of language 
which are incapable of producing an infinity of sentences. 
Specifically, Chomsky takes this opportunity to 
attack the notion of "grammatical habit" as used by 
Jespersen. 	He suggests that even as a metaphor, it is a 
poor description and if it is intended as anything more 
concrete than a metaphor, it is a description which loses all 
content. 	Chomsky confines the description of 'habit' or 
'familiarity' to those cliches or formulaic phrases which 
are totally fixed expressions. 
Chomsky tackles the topic of the creativity of 
language in a substantial way in Language and Mind (Revised 
version, 1972). 	His reference to the topic in the new 
preface is interesting: 
C .] a number of professional linguists have repeatedly 
confused what I refer to here as 'the creative aspect of 
language use' with the recursive property of generative 
grammars, a very different matter " (p.viii). 
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Perhaps these professional linguists could be 
forgiven their confusion in the light of Chomsky's earlier 
description in Aspects: 
"Although it was well understood that linguistic 
processes are in some sense 'creative', the technical 
devices for expressing a system of recursive processes 
were simply not available until much more recently " 
(13.8), 
However, it must be assumed that the statement in 
Language and Mind is the explicit position, and therefore that 
the recursive properties of generative grammar are only part 
(if that) of the creativity inherent in the grammar 	If rule- 
governed creativity is considered in the light of this 
statement then, unfortunately, it removes the one concrete 
example of how the grammar is creative. 	Chomsky has never 
been very explicit on this topic, but his one specified 
creative device (as stated in Aspects) is now downgraded. 
A new formulation of creativity is provided in 
Language and Mind against a historical perspective and 
perhaps not necessarily reflecting Chomsky's own position: 
"This new principle pf mind] has a 'creative aspect' 
which is evidenced most clearly in what we may refer 
to as 'the creative aspect of language use', the 
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distinctively human ability to express new thoughts 
and to understand entirely new expressions of thought 
within the framework of an 'instituted language', a 
language that is a cultural product subject to laws and 
principles partially unique to it and partially 
reflections of general properties of mind " (p.6). 
This description is more sophisticated and subtle, 
yet contains some vague references. 	Firstly, it appears 
clearly to state that the non-material principle called 
mind, possesses an 'aspect' or property described as 
'creative'. 	Secondly, this property of mind is realised 
(in one way) through the creative use of language. 	Thirdly, 
the creative use of language is described as the ability to 
express new thoughts' and to understand those of 
other people. 	It is unclear whether the .description literally 
intends to refer to 'thoughts' or whether the phrase 'express 
new thoughts' refers to new sentences, as Chamsky has 
hitherto intended. 	This question must be left open at 
this stage. 
Chomsky then makes another historical foray in 
search of his philosophical forebears. 	The three levels 
of intelligence postulated by the sixteenth century physician, 
Juan Huarte, are summarised by Chomsky. 	The second level 
pertains to human intelligence: 
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"Thus, normal human intelligence is capable of 
acquiring knowledge through its own internal resources, 
perhaps making use of the data of sense, but going 
on to construct a cognitive system in terms of concepts 
and principles that are developed on independent 
grounds; and it is capable of generating new thoughts 
and of finding appropriate and novel ways of expressing 
them, in ways that entirely transcend any training or 
experience " (p.9). 
The emphasis here suggests that there is a dual 
creativity at work. 	Firstly, the creative process of mind 
itself in generating new thoughts; secondly, the creative 
process of expressing these thoughts through language. 
The essential matter of the link between the two is left 
vague but then the whole treatise attempts to tackle this 
problem and to expect a single sentence adequately to describe 
the link may be asking too much. 
Huarte's third level exists to account for "true 
creativity, an exercise of the creative imagination in ways 
thaf go beyond normal intelligence " (p.9). 	This level 
is intended to explain the relatively rare examples where the 
creative mind produces something truly original. 	It is the 
creativity of the artist. 
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Chomsky moves on to the later period of Cartesian 
thought and provides a summary of the philosophical proofs 
for the existence of other minds and the uniqueness of 
mind to man, based on the creative aspect of language (p.11). 
This is followed by a clarification of what Chomsky believes 
the Cartesians to be saying about language. 	Essentially, 
it turns on three principles, parts of which Chomsky referred 
to in the earlier Cartesian Linguistics, but which are now•
stated with greater force and clarity. 
The first principle is stated thus: 
"The normal use of language is innovative, in the 
sense that much of what we say in the course of normal 
language use is entirely new " (p.12). 
This is essentially the argument of unboundedness of 
language, or the infinity principle. 
The second principle is as follows; 
"But the normal use of language is not only innovative 
and potentially infinite in scope, but also free from 
the control of detectable stimuli, either external or 
internal " (p.12). 
This is essentially the argument of freedom from stimulus 
control. 
The third argument is as follows: 
'... its coherence and its 'appropriateness to the 
situation' - which, of course, is an entirely different 
matter from control by external stimuli. 	Just what 
'appropriateness' and 'coherence' may consist in we 
cannot say in any clear or definite way, but there is 
no doubt that these are meaningful concepts. 	We can 
distinguish normal use of language from the ravings of 
a maniac or the output of a computer with a random 
element " (p.12). 
Chomsky obviously recognises the weakness of the 
third Cartesian argument, but it is essential since the 
earlier two arguments are inconclusive proof against a 
mechanical explanation of language. 	That is, the debate 
returns to the uniqueness of man and for that the third 
argument is essential. 	However, to leave it as a mystery 
is unsatisfactory and Chomsky's appeal to common sense is 
only partly convincing. 	Some maniacs speak perfectly 
normally and computers can "speak" perfectly coherently as 
well as appropriately to their situation even if this 
situation is far less complex than man's ordinary situations. 
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Chomsky is by no means dogmatic about the arguments, 
as he makes clear in the following: 
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"Honesty forces us to admit that we are as far today 
as Descartes was three centuries ago from understanding 
just what enables a human to speak in a way that is 
innovative, free from stimulus control, and also 
appropriate and coherent it (pp,12-13). 
Chomsky carries this position forward into the 
present: 
"Surely the classical questions of language and mind 
receive no final solution, or even the hint of a final 
solution, from the work that is being actively pursued 
today... 	For example, the central problems relating 
to the creative aspect of language use remain as 
inaccessible as they have always been " (p.99). 
And yet: 
"Real progress has been made in the study of the 
mechanisms of language, the formal principles that 
make possible the creative aspect of language use " 
(p.99). 
Given that the recursive properties of generative 
grammar are specifically excluded from "the creative aspect 
of language use", there is precious little for the commentator 
to consider as "real progress". 	Certainly, little is specified 
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by Chomsky, and what is specified is largely philosophical 
argument in favour of the notion of creativity of mind. 
This last statement of Chomsky must be accepted sceptically, 
if at all; the proof is still awaited. 
In a later essay, included in the revised version of 
Language and Mind, Chomsky opens his discussion with a summary 
of the three properties of human language: innovative, 
stimulus-free, and coherent/appropriate. 	Again Chomsky 
points out the difficulty in the task of explaining the 
mechanisms of mind, thought, and language. 	He appears to 
be becoming more sceptical than ever of producing the details 
of these mechanisms: 
"We do not understand, and for all we know, we may 
never come to understand what makes it possible for 
a normal human intelligence to use language as an 
instrument for the free expression of thought and 
feeling; or, for that matter, what qualities of mind 
are involved in the creative acts of intelligence that 
are characteristic, not unique and exceptional, in a 
truly human existence " (p.10). 
In For Reasons of State (1973), a collection of 
political essays, Chomsky includes an essay on "Language 
and Freedom" which concentrates on developing the notion of 
human essence as a bridging principle between his political 
and linguistic writings. 	In the course of this, he frequently 
refers to the Cartesian arguments for mind, based on the 
creative aspect of language, as well as to the Humboldtian 
concept of creativity within bounds. 	However, no 
additional explication of the creative aspect of language 
is made. 
In "Knowledge of Language" in Language, Mind and 
Knowledge (1975) (K. Gunderson, ed.), Chomsky returns to his 
description of creative language as being innovative, 
stimulus-free and coherent/appropriate, but he adds a new 
clarification of the relationship of human language to 
other human or non-human systems of communication: 
"it is quite pointless to speculate about the evolution 
of human language from animal communication systems, 
as pointless as it would be to speculate about the 
evolution of language from gesture. 	It is an 
interesting question whether properties of human 
language are shared by other cognitive systems " (p.303). 
This appears to raise the speculation whether 
the creative aspect of language has an analogy in other 
human cognitive systems. 	In Chomsky's view, it is best 
to keep an open mind on such questions. 
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Chomsky returns to many of the philosophical, 
psychological and linguistic questions which interest him 
in Reflections on Language (1976). 	Generally, he summarises 
his earlier comments on the topic of the creative aspect 
of language use, especially referring to the three principles 
of innovation, stimulus-freedom and coherence/appropriateness. 
In a footnote (n.11 Ch.1) he emphasizes that these properties 
of human language cannot "be identified with the recursive 
property of grammars". 
A later comment appears to contradict the earlier 
suggestion in "Knowledge of Language" that other cognitive 
systems may be analogous to the language faculty, since the 
visual system for instance, which Chomsky often refers to, 
is obviously shared with non-humans: 
"It is a reasonable surmise, I think, that there is 
no structure similar to U.G. in non-human organisms and 
that the capacity for free, appropriate, and creative 
use of language as an expression of thought, with the 
means provided by the language faculty, is also a 
distinctive feature of the human species, having no 
significant analogue elsewhere " (p.40). 
Admittedly, the earlier comment was speculative, 
but then so is the later comment. 	Apparently, this particular 
question is not only speculative, but uncertain, even in Chomsky's 
own approach to the matter. 
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Chomsky makes some further general references 
to the restraints on creativity inherent in the structure 
of the mind: 
"Creativity is predicated on a system of rules and 
forms, in part determined by intrinsic human capacities. 
Without such constraints we have arbitrary and random 
behaviour, not creative acts " (p.133). 
This principle of creativity within bounds has 
been referred to previously by Chomsky, but never in the 
precise manner as stated here (see Babitch (1976) for a 
similar view of Chomsky's notion of creativity). 	The 
importance of this matter for Chomsky can be seen from the 
fact that this quotation is taken from an argument regarding 
human nature as it pertains to political philosophy. 
However, ultimately Chomsky refers the problem 
of creativity to the areas of enquiry he terms "mysteries" 
as opposed to "problems": 
"What I have called elsewhere 'the creative aspect of 
language use' remains as much a mystery to us as it was 
to the Cartesians who discussed it, in part, in the 
context of the problem of 'other minds'. 	Some would 
reject this evaluation of the state of our understanding. 
I do not propose to argue the point here, but rather to 
turn to the problems that do seem to me amenable to 
inquiry " (p.139). 
It is the purpose of this study to determine 
whether Chomsky's evaluation of this "mystery" as not 
amenable to inquiry is correct or not. 
It is worth noting that an element of the 
creative aspect of language use which Chomsky discussed in 
Cartesian Linguistics (1966) is treated somewhat differently 
in Rules and Representations (1980). 	The ability to respond 
appropriately in a particular context was described as 
part of the creative aspect of language use in the earlier 
text. 	In the later text, Chomsky distinguishes between this 
aspect of language use and knowledge of language itself: 
"We may proceed to distinguish 'grammatical competence' 
from 'pragmatic competence', restricting the first to 
the knowledge of form and meaning and the second to 
knowledge of conditions and manner qf appropriate use, 
in conformity with various purposes." (p.224); 
and; 
"We might say that pragmatic competence places language 
' in the institutional setting of its use, relating 
intentions and purposes to the linguistic means at hand ." 
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Divorcing the pragmatic aspect of language use 
from the grammatical aspect makes creativity straddle two 
separate arenas. 	The creative aspect of use is of interest 
but is not necessarily related to the linguistic capacities. 
In fact, there is no particular reason to assume that man 
is capable of appropriately using only language. 	Other 
semiotic systems may equally well be credited with a 
pragmatic aspect and, if so, it seems to refer to a general 
human capacity to act appropriately. 	There is not even 
a necessity to confine such a capacity to cognitive aspects 
of human behaviour. 
The question remains what the creative aspect 
of grammatical competence is. 	It is more than mere syntactic 
creativity since that is a mechanical property of the syntactic 
rules-and-elements system. 	Within the Chomskian approach, 
this question is only hinted at, 
In summary, and ignoring changes through time, 
Chomsky's explicit position on creativity in language is as 
follows: 
"Language possesses a capacity for producing novel 
sentences, 	This necessitates that the model of language 
has to account for the capacity to produce an infinite number 
of novel sentences, 	This creative capacity of language implies 
that man is uniquely different from other creatures since other 
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communication systems are not creative in this sense. 
This creative capacity is realised through rule-governed 
creativity and rule-changing creativity. 
"The creative aspect of language is directly 
related to the creative aspect of thought. 	Language is 
a medium for creatively expressing new thoughts. 	Since 
this mental-linguistic capacity is found only in man, it 
is proof of the existence of mind and of other minds. 
The properties of this capacity are threefold: it is unbounded 
(innovative, infinite), stimulus-free, and coherent and 
appropriate to the situation. 	These properties are not 
possessed, especially not the last, by any other communication 
system. 	It also implies that language is not firstly a 
functional system, but rather a creative, self-expressive 
system. 
"Creativity in language cannot be explained by 
analogy or by generalisation, and although it is a part of 
the normal use of language, it is also linked to the artistic 
use of language, for instance, through the use of rule-changing 
creativity as a literary device. 	Rule-changing creativity 
is, therefore, as much part of the grammar as rule-governed 
creativity. 	The rules of grammar, •as well as the rules 	of 
mind which are derived from experience through the acquisition 
of knowledge, are the constraints which give direction to 
human creativity." 
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Chomsky thus provides an array of arguments 
in a clutch of disciplines, all based on his notion of the 
creativity of language. 	In philosophy, the notion - leads 
to a proof for the existence of mind and of other minds, 
and some suggestions concerning the link between thought 
and language, as well as the epistemological questions 
implied by such a link. 	In psychology, the notion proves 
the basis for Chomsky's criticism of theories of performance 
which are based on the functional aspect of language; such 
studies are trivial when compared to the essence of language 
which is self-expression. 	As well, he puts forward the 
view that the mental structures which accommodate language 
are unique to language although they may have derived from 
other cognitive structures. 	He specifies three properties 
of language (unbounded, stimulus-free and coherence/appropriate-
ness) which must be accounted for. 	In political theory, 
Chomsky uses the notion to describe a theory of human nature 
from which certain political conclusions may be drawn. 
In literary theory, the notion provides a model of language 
use based on self-expression, as well as describing some 
devices (based on rule-changing creativity) which may be 
used in the production of "literary" language. 
However, the central consideration lies with 
theoretical linguistics. 	Here, Chomsky is concerned to 
establish a grammar which can account for the rules of 
language as well as for the fact that these rules can be 
broken without producing ungrammatical sentences (in the 
sense of not belonging to the corpus of a language). 
The implications are that the model must specify the means 
by which new sentences in accordance with the rules of 
the model are generated, as well as the means by which 
sentences not in accordance with the rules of the model 
are generated. 	The model must be able to distinguish 
between rule-breaking (i.e. non-permissible or grammatical 
sentences which by breaking a rule add a new rule to the 
model). 	It thus provides a vehicle for language change. 
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3. RULE-GOVERNED- CREATIVITY. 
1. The Infinity of Language and the Notion of Creativity. 
To build a concept of creativity into a description 
of language engenders a range of problems which have to be 
solved. 	Chomsky is more explicit about rule-governed 
creativity than he is about rule-changing creativity. 
Chomsky's notion of rule-governed creativity may amount to 
nothing more than hyperbole and, in fact, there is some 
evidence to suggest it is inaccurate. 
Rule-governed creativity is based on the notion 
that there is an infinite or indefinite number of sentences 
in any language. 	Chomsky has repeated this claim in all 
his major texts and relies on its strength as a "truism" 
(Chomsky, 1965, p.198). 	However, the notion has been 
severely criticised, especially by Bjurlof and Jamieson (1979), 
Moulton (1978), and Bouveresse (Parret, 1974). 
Four main arguments have been brought to bear 
against Chomsky's"truism", Firstly, it is argued that 
although recursive devices, such as embedded sentences, allow 
the generation of long sentences, human memory and understanding 
effectively limit the length of such sentences. 	"The 	House 
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that Jack Built" does not go on indefinitely. 	This 
argument relates to performance factors and therefore 
would be dismissed by Chomsky as of no consequence: 
"Linguistic theory is concerned primarily with an 
ideal speaker/listener, in a completely homogenous 
speech-community, who knows its language perfectly 
and is unaffected by such grammatically irrelevant 
conditions as memory limitations, distraction, 
shifts of attention and interest, and errors (random 
or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the 
language in actual performance " (Chomsky, 1965, p.3). 
It is, of course, possible to dispute such an 
approach, but that would be an argument based on the goals 
of linguistic theory. 	For the moment, it must be concluded 
that if the grammar models the competence of a speaker, then 
performance variables are irrelevant. 	However, this does 
suggest that Chomsky did not intend to include the infinite 
productivity of the grammar as a part of the creative 
aspect of language use since that formulation clearly implies 
a performance aspect. 	In other words, it suggests that 
infinite productivity is not creativity and vice versa. 
A second approach to the notion of an infinity of 
sentences derives from the exposition of Moulton (1987) of the 
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immense productivity of language. 	Moulton assumes that 
language is a communication system, comparable to other 
communication systems yet vastly more complex and, therefore, 
more productive. 	He makes a serious attempt to calculate 
the number of possible sentences and succeeds in demonstrating 
that there are limitations to the productivity of language. 
One such limitation touches on the meaning of 
"sentence". 	Moulton suggests that whetever else a sentence 
must have in order to be a sentence, it must have a terminal 
intonation. 	This is a fact of the grammar of sentences: 
"The first claim (that recursive devices permit a 
sentence to be infinitely long) is grammatically false. 
A sentence must come to an end somewhere (with a terminal 
intonation), for otherwise it is not a sentence; hence, 
no such sentence can be infinitely long " (Moulton, 1978, 
p.16). 
Even if the perspective of Moulton that language 
is a communication system is disregarded (since Chomsky would 
not be likely to accept it; see Chomsky, 1965 and 1966), 
his description of the grammatical requirement of terminal 
intonation seems valid. 	A sentence is a complete unit in 
some sense and without a marker to indicate the termination of 
the unit (in speech, with intonation; in writing, with a full 
stop) it is incomplete. 
However, this argument, as Moulton suggests, 
only limits sentence length and does not limit the number 
of sentences in a language since the two basic recursive 
devices (co-ordination and sub-ordination) theoretically 
allow an infinite number of sentences. 	Moulton adds that 
for practical purposes, actual performance will limit the 
number of sentences in a language to a number less than 
infinity, but how this happens is not yet known. 
Chomsky, by constructing a formal grammar divorced 
from all performance variables, is therefore apparently 
correct in claiming an infinite generating capacity for his 
grammar. 	It is a mathematical capacity and questions may 
be raised as to its relevance to a natural language and, indeed, 
the justification for hypothesizing a competence-performance 
distinction. 	This is a debate which has not yet been settled 
(Hockett, 1968, and for a recent summary, Slobin, 1979). 
Bjurlof and Jamieson (1979) put forward a third 
argument against the notion that language consists of an 
infinity of sentences. 	They introduce the logical concept 
of the "fuzzy set" to make the distinction between an infinite 
set and an indefinite set. 	The former, they suggest, requires 
proof that there is unbounded recursion, not just that there is 
not a cut-off point for some sentences. 	A fuzzy set does not 
require a cut-off point and may, therefore, adequately describe 
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the set of all sentences of a language, without recourse 
to infinity. 
Bjurlof and Jamieson do not wish to quarrel with 
the notion that the syntactic component of a Chomskyan 
grammar is infinite in the sense that it is possible to 
generate an infinite number of strings of phrase structure 
markers. 	But this infinity is limited to indefiniteness 
when the semantic component is imposed upon the syntactic 
component. 	There are limitations upon understanding and, 
hence, there are limitations upon the number of sentences 
in a language. 
These arguments suggest that rule-governed 
creativity is a misnomer which really intends to capture 
the capacity of the grammar to generate an infinite number 
of syntactic skeletons. 	The creative aspect lies in the 
flesh of the sentences - the semantic component. 
The fourth argument against the notion that rule-
governed creativity is creative in any sense of the word 
is .the trivial nature of such a description. 	Bouveresse 
clearly finds it a misleading description to apply to a 
mechanical function. 
Bouveresse (Parret, 1974) raises the point that 
Chomsky distinguishes between two types of creativity. 
Bouveresse describes one type as "mathematical or formal 
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(the recursive property of grammar) " (p.322) ; 
"A relatively simple automaton which has initial 
elements and recursive formation processes at its 
disposal may very well be gifted with the first type 
of "creativity". 	It is possible that although 
its productions are potentially infinite, they are 
totally trivial " (p.322). 
It seems that Chomsky's description of the infinity 
of sentences and, hence, the necessity of a creative aspect 
of language use is based on a loose use of words. 	He uses 
rinfinite"and'indefinitewithout distinguishing between them 
(Chomsky, 1965). 
There is no need for the concept of infinity of 
sentences if the purpose is to underscore the creative 
resources of language. 	The number of possible sentences, 
even if finite, is so large that to all intents and 
purposes individual creative acts can occur constantly 
without diminishing the potential of the system 	(Moulton, 1978). 
This has generated some discussion Gm.) the limits 
of the kind of system Chomsky postulates. 	Formally, it is 
infinite or perhaps only indefinite. In either case, the 
resources of the system are immense. 	Practically, it is 
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limited by performance variables, and it may be that the 
grammar is only a mechanical model which has no separate 
existence from the practical uses to which language is put; 
that is, competence may only be an artificial abstraction. 
In any case, these arguments are somewhat beside 
the point since we may grant the vast productiveness of 
Chomsky's grammar, and even its indefiniteness, without 
touching the essential point which is whether an appropriate 
description of this immenseness is that it is creative. 
I suggested that it is creative only in the sense that the 
function which generates all natural numbers is creative. 
Such mechanical productivity amounts to a misuse of the word 
"creativity", 	Moulton (1978) makes the point that it is the 
use to which this capacity is put that is creative, 	Whether 
immense, indefinite or infinite, the system has sufficient 
resources to allow individual acts of creative use to occur 
constantly without diminishing the potential of the system, 
The creativity of such acts resides in the appropriateness 
and coherence of the utterance, and not in the rapacity of the 
system to be able to generate that utterande, 
Choimskys concentration on the syntactic component 
of language has led him to confuse the syntactic capacity of 
his grammar with its semantic Capacity, Where the syntactic 
component maygenerate an infinite series of strings through 
such recursive devices as co,ordination and subordination, the 
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semantic component places limitations upon the length and 
complexity of such strings. 	Rule-governed creativity is 
thereby confined to the syntactic component, and if it must 
be described as creativity, it ought to be 
"syntactic creativity". 
2. Descriptions of Creativity.  
Although Chomsky is the theorist largely responsible 
for the introduction of creativity into linguistic theory, 
other theorists have made comment on this notion. 
McCawley (Parret, 1974) supports the notion of 
creativity as essentially a truism. 	He suggests that it 
was an essential notion in combating the "descriptivist 
orthodoxy" (p.253) of early theoretical linguistics. 
He adds that it is now readily accepted and is compatible 
with many theories of language. 
McCawley relates creativity to performance 
variables: 
"What makes language creative is that a language can 
be used as an all-purpose instrument, to express 
meanings appropriate to essentially any information 
that one might want to convey. 
A language can accommodate itself to all possible 
subject matters, to any possible intention of the 
speaker " (p.253). 
This suggests that McCawley is confusing Chomsky's 
syntactic creativity with flexibility. 	No. one would 
dispute that language is immensely flexible and adaptable. 
But that does not make it creative, only extensive. 	This 
suggests that McCawley is concerned not with rule-governed 
creativity, but with the immense resources of language 
which allow the user to adapt the system to meet his 
requirements in almost any situation. 	McCawley is, •therefore, 
concerned with the pragmatic resources of the language and 
not with its syntactic capacities. 
Martinet (Parret, 1974) views the notion of 
creativity in a way which contrasts directly with McCawley. 
Martinet sees the creative capacities of the language system, 
such as the creation of a new word by the recombination of 
given elements,as "nothing mysterious" (p.230). 	At the 
same time, he suggests that it is possible to go beyond 
"what could be described as their competence" (p.230) and 
produce ".unexpected linguistic behaviours" (p.230) as is the 
case when people take some liberties with the language and 
with tradition,. (p.230). This view leaves more unexplained 
than it explains, but it appears that Martinet is allowing 
50 
51. 
some creative capacities into his description of language. 
But he confines these in some strict way which would mark 
any unusual or different utterances as outside the language. 
Therefore, to some extent, he allows rule-changing 
creativity (e.g. neologisms). 
Lamb (Parret, 1974) embraces the notion of 
creativity and applies it widely in different ways. 	After 
noting rule-governed creativity, Lamb describes idioms as an 
example of a creative ability. 	Further, he describes the 
ability "to create new concepts, new collocations in which 
you take two ideas that have been separate and discover 
that they can be put together" 	p.217). 
This latter type of creativity belOngs 
to a mental capacity which may lie outside the scope of 
language although ultimately it may be the motivation for 
the creative aspect of language use. 	It may relate to 
metaphor. 
Lakoff (Parret, 1974) echoes the views 
expressed by Martinet. 	He denies that there is anything 
creative in the language system and states that recursive devices 
which produce novel sentences are a mechanical factor rather 
than a creative capacity of the system. 	Lakoff clearly 
limits the notion to rule-governed creativity and tends to 
ignore any other interpretation of creativity. 
Halliday (Parret, 1974) places creativity within 
his theory of social semiotics. 	Whatever else creativity 
is, it is an individual act and therefore it presents a 
particular difficulty for a theorist of social structure 
who views language as a medium for the transmission of 
that structure. 	Halliday defines creativity as "new 
interpretations of existing behaviour in existing social 
contexts, in new semiotic patterns, however realized", 
and "the creativity of the individual is a function of the 
social system" 	(p.117). 	Thus, creativity is again 
confined to mental acts y with no great interest in how they 
are realized in the language. 
Only Chafe (Parret, 1974) admits that there is a 
creative aspect of language use which is part of language but 
exists by breaking the rules which have been formulated to 
date. 	He discusses idioms and defines metaphors as 
restricted idioms: "Authors can use them for particular purposes 
and do not really follow a standard usage. 	That creative 
aspect of metaphors presents a real problem" (p.19). 
Chafe attempts to extend the concept of idiom to account for 
context-bound meaning, such as the meaning of "make" in 
"make the bed". 
This approach is further explored in Chafe (1970) 
where the concept of idiomaticization is utilised to explain 
how new semantic units are introduced into the lexicon. 
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Chafe postulates a distinction between phonetic structure 
and semantic structure in which symbolisation is the mediating 
force. 	Thus the meaning of 'make' is symbolised phonetically 
as "make". 	Given this, it is possible for a second meaning, 
for instance, 'restore to a properly neat condition', to be • 
symbolised phonetically as "make", as in "make the bed". 
This latter expression is therefore ambiguous. 	Chafe 
calls this second meaning an idiom. 	When it is restricted 
to a particular context as in "make the bed", then it is a 
restricted idiom; if it is not confined in this way, it is 
an unrestricted idiom. 	In this sense, metaphors are 
restricted idioms. 
Strictly speaking, this terminology is not correct, 
since Chafe's restricted idioms are not metaphors. 	Metaphors 
result from the coupling of two semantically anomalous units 
of meaning to produce a new meaning. 	"Make the bed" has a 
meaning that derives from the phrase as a whole. 	Etymologically, 
its origin may lie in the amgibuity of "make", but semantically 
it exists only as one complete idiomatic expression. 
Yet in his discussion, Chafe (1970) touches on 
the problem of how new meanings are added to the language. 
He mentions sources such as transference from a different 
language ("sauerkraut") and deliberate invention ("Kodak"). 
He then elaborates his theory of idiomaticization. 
However, he confines his discussion to how new meanings are 
symbolised into a phonetic structure, thus having language 
respond to a need to express a new meaning. 	But 
more than that, in that it uses existing language resources 
to produce a new meaning. 	If we use "pickled cabbage" or 
a nonsense word instead of "sauerkraut" and "Kodak", it 
would not have mattered. 	If we paraphrase a metaphor, 
something is usually lost. 
Parret (1974) concludes his dialogues with a 
lengthy discussion with Jacques Bouveresse. 	Creativity 
is one subject which is covered, largely in terms of a 
criticism of Chomsky's usage of the notion of "creativity". 
Bouveresse characterises creativity as an aspect 
of performance. 	Creativity is the capacity to respond to 
an indefinitely large variety of situations in an appropriate 
way; it relates to language use. 	Competence, as described 
formally in the grammar of a language, accounts for the 
possibility of producing and understanding an indefinitely 
large number of utterances. 	Creativity is the use of this 
capacity in appropriate ways. 	This, in turn, is a response to 
the potentially infinite number of ideas which a person may 
have: 
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"The truly creative faculty of man is located on 
the level of the production of ideas 1. 1 (p.323). 
For Bouveresse, the creative capacity at the 
ideational level is realised by means of the formally 
infinite resources of the grammar in order that the 
language user can respond appropriately to indefinitely 
many situations. 	Creativity describes the interaction 
between the production of ideas and the constraints of 
language. 	It is attractive to fit Chomsky's rule-changing 
creativity into this description as the special outcome 
of such interaction in situations where the resources of 
languages are not adequate to the task of ideational 
representation. 	However, it is clear that Bouveresse 
dismisses the purely mechanical notions of creativity 
and confines the use of creativity to a different activity 
altogether, that is the ideational process. 
Moravcsik (1969) also tackles the notion of 
creativity, in the context of a discussion of the concept 
of linguistic competence. 	He identifies two uses of the 
notion by Chomsky. 	The first ( creativity') is "the 
ability to interpret novel utterances". (p.424). 
The second ( creativity") is "the property of being free 
from stimulus control and instrumental constraints". (p.424). 
The distinction is drawn in the following way: 
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"The first 'creativity' is a property of the 
competent language user and is part of his linguistic 
competence. 	The second is a property of the processes 
underlying linguistic competence " (p.242). 
In essence, this is the distinction Chamsky made 
in Current Issues in Linguistic Vuxwy and it is discussed in 
Chapter Two of the present study. 
Moravcsik notes that "creativity" is empirically 
falsifiable,and, since it is not disconfirmed by direct 
observation, certain conclusions may be drawn from this 
claim; 	for instance, that language learning cannot be 
confined to "mere explicit instruction of the structure 
and meaning of various utterances" (p.425). 
"Creativity" is less empirical and is a ,complex 
property of linguistic competence. 	It relates to Chomsky's 
claim that language is quintessentially a self-expressive 
capacity as opposed to a functional or communicative Capacity 
in man, and it is free from external stimuli because it is 
not .necessarily determined by changes in the external or 
internal environment. 
Moravcsik correctly concludes that "creativity" is 
largely a negative concept. 	It says what language is not. 
He attempts to counter this by formulating a positive 
version. 	To do this, he couples the concept with the 
claim that: 
"the use of language is determined only by the process 
of thinking, and that the latter is autonomous.,.., 
Thus the full hypothesis states that thinking is free 
from stimulus, need, desire, drive and instrumental 
control and that the use of language is correlated with 
thinking only "  
"Creativity" is therefore an aspect of the brain-
mind-language puzzle and Moravcsik, perhaps correctly, has 
widened the scope of the inquiry as well as complicated it. 
In his words: 
"These empirical claims admit only of indirect 
verification or disconfirmation," (p.427). 
Moravcsik sees the formulation he has given to 
the notion or notions of creativity as assisting linguistic 
inquiry in two ways. 	Firstly, the creativity claims will 
liMit the possible answers to the question of how language 
is acquired. 	If language is free from external control, 
then concepts such as conditioning and inner drives can 
have no role to play in any account of language acquisition. 
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Secondly, if language is a means.for self-expression 
and not a mere coummnicative device, then functional explanations 
will not have any bearing on any theory of linguistic 
competence. 
For the purposes of the present study, Moravcsik 
only reflects, perhaps in a more focussed way, the views of 
Chomsky. 	Thus, he contributes little to the notion of 
creativity since it is perceived in strictly Chamskian 
terms. 
In sumwary, many theorists have commented upon 
creativity but its description varies. 	At least three 
notions have emerged from the theorists reviewed here. 
Firstly, syntactic creativity, or Chomsky's rule-governed 
creativity, which refers to the capacity of formal grammars 
to generate an infinite series of syntactic strings. 
Secondly, pragmatic creativity, which refers to the fact 
that a speaker is able to produce utterances which are 
appropriate to the situation in which the speaker is placed; - 
it attempts to account for the variety, relevance and 
cohesiveness of language uttered in a particular situation. 
Thirdly, semantic creativity, which refers to the capacity of 
speakers to produce utterances which appear to be entirely 
novel in their semantic content and typically break a rule of 
language (especially a syntactic rule); neologisms and 
metaphors are examples of this kind of creativity. 
3. Ilahguage- and CreatiVity". 
The notion that language is capable of immense 
productivity (an aspect of competence) and that a user is 
able to apply this capacity to an indefinitely large nunther -
of situations by producing appropriate utterances (an aspect 
of performance) has led to some interest in whether this 
duality adds anything to our perspective of man. 	Chomsky 
elevates the notion of creativity to the heights of mystery; 
Den Ouden in Language and Creativity (1975) descends to 
of speculation in his enthusiasm to "apply" Chomskyan linguistics 
to metaphysics. 
Calling his Study "An Interdisciplinary Essay in Chomskyan 
Humanism", Den Ouden is chiefly concerned to derive evidence 
from Chomsky's work to support his argument regarding "man 
and human nature", (Den Ouden, 1975, p.7). 	Den Ouden's 
purpose is to define the distinctive features of man which 
make him different from other species. 	He hopes to find 
evidence in Chomsky's work that it is creativity which is 
the essence of man: "I shall argue that 'human being' is 
human creativity : " (ibid. p.8, n.1). 	Sampson (1975), for 
instance, demonstrates that a quite different conclusion can 
be drawn from Chomsky's linguistic work as to the implications 
for man's alleged uniqueness as a language..using animal. 
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It is clear, therefore, that Den Ouden makes 
no claim to any original observations in linguistics, but 
that his work is openly derivatery. 	However, it is of 
interest since it is one of the few attempts to grapple 
with creativity in language, even if the perspective is 
directly metaphysical rather than linguistic. 
Den Ouden's approach centres on arguments drawn 
from several sources which, to some extent, parallel 
Chomsky's sources: Cartesian metaphysics, nineteenth,T. 
century German philosophy of language, and anti-empiricism. 
The purpose of this review is to consider only those comments 
which either relate to the notion of creativity in language 
or which use this notion for some other argument. 
From his very first comment, it is clear that Den 
Ouden intertwines "generative", "creative", "transformational", 
and "competence". 	It is difficult, at any one time, to be 
sure which Den Ouden is referring to or which text he is 
paraphrasing. 	For example, from his formation of the implicit 
knowledge which a user possesses, Chomsky concluded that a 
grammar must have the capacity to generate an indefinitely 
large number of sentences. 	Den Ouden comments: 
"The key to language acquisition and use is thus 
creativity and generation of alternative linguistic 
constructs " (p.12). 
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Chomsky is describing an aspect of his grammar which attempts 
to describe the competence of a user of language. 	He resorts 
to recursive devices to build a generative capacity into his 
grammar. 	Den Ouden interprets this to relate to performance 
variables ("language acquisition and use") and sums up 
Chomsky's meaning by describing it as creative and linking it 
to the "generation of alternative linguistic constructs". 
This argument is worthy of attention because it 
demonstrates Den Ouden's approach. 	He glosses over 
distinctions without making them explicit and uses terms 
without explanation or definition. 	He will use "generation 
of alternative linguistic constructs" repeatedly, but without 
clarification. 	If it is intended to mean what it says, then 
presumably the ability to construct the passive from an 
active is included as creative. 	At worst, Den Ouden is 
badly paraphrasing Chomsky's notion of rule-governed creativity, 
which is creative in only the most mechanical of sense. 
Further, he is suggesting that competence equals creativity: 
"Creative language use consists of the generation of 
alternative forms of expression. 	This is radically 
different from mere performance which could be produced 
by mere memorization " (p.12). 
If Den Ouden defines creative language use as a 
user's competence, then we will need to know more of his , 
concept of competence. This would be extremely useful since 
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it relates in a special way to his concept of performance, 
and neither concept relates very much to Chomsky's formulation 
of competence and performance. 
After this exposition of Chomskyan theory, Den 
Ouden turns to Chomsky's philosophical precursors. 	He 
summarises the arguments of Cartesian Linguistics, which relate 
to the notion that man has a unique capacity which 
distinguishes him from machines and animals in that he is 
able to respond appropriately to indefinitely many situations. 
Various quotations from Descartes, Cordemoy and the Port-Royal 
_ grammarians, derived from Cartesian Linguistics„, suggest that 
there is a recurring tendency to attribute to man a capacity 
of cognitive freedom which is expressed through his language 
and at the same time the underlying structure of language 
suggests that all men possess some linguistic structures in 
common. 	Den Ouden intends to solve this apparent contradiction 
in later chapters. 
In reviewing the German Romantic philosophers, Den - 
Ouden adds Hamann to the philosophers discussed by Chomsky (1966), 
Herder, Humboldt and Schlegel. 	In the process, he is given 
the opportunity to emphasize an aspect of their thinking which 
Chomsky de-emphasized (1966, p.30), but which Den Ouden is 
interested in: linguistic relativity. 	His concern is to 
resolve the apparent contradiction between theories of 
linguistic universals and linguistic relativity. 
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Den Ouden emphasizes that Chomsky's concern was 
the observations which these thinkers made regarding 
creativity, and other primitive versions of Chomskyan 
concepts such as deep structure. 	Nevertheless, his 
object is to pursue the notion of linguistic relativity 
which is strongly represented in the tradition to which 
Chomsky appeals, in seeking support_for his own theory of deep 
and surface structure, and creativity in language. 
In his attempt to unite linguistic relativity 
with linguistic universals, Den Ouden takes somewhat unusual 
approach. 	It is worth noting that his usage is only 
approximate, in that he provides -multiple paraphrases 
rather than definitions: 
"It was noted previously that Chomsky recognized and 
describes Herder, Schlegel, and Humboldt as thinkers 
who anticipate his own theory of creative language use. 
It was also noted that Chomsky pays very little attention 
to the facets of their work that point strongly in the 
direction of linguistic relativity. . The question that 
must be resolved is: Can Chomsky's emphasis on grammatical 
universality be reconciled with the view that language 
is also linguistically relative. 	On the surface, the 
two views seem irreconcilable, that is, either language 
reflects linguistic relativity or it reflects universal 
human characteristics. 	For Herder and Humboldt, it 
reflects both. 	Language, for Herder and Humboldt, 
as for Chomsky, is a species-specific capacity that 
is indicative of the unique intellectual capacities 
of man. 	This unique capacity is what Chomsky argues 
is reflected in the creative aspect of language use. 
Human nature, thus, in the Chomskyan perspective, is 
very closely related to human activity. 	Herder and 
Humboldt, as was previously indicated, argued a 
similar point and contend that language is indicative 
of unique intellectual capacities that are specific 
to man. 	Herder and Humboldt maintained, however, 
that language as a species-specific capacity is also 
linguistically relative. 
"Their resolution of the tension between universal human 
characteristics and linguistics relativity is basically 
the following: Language in its creative and innovative 
function is unique to and with man. 	As such, it reflects 
a universal characteristic, that is, it reflects the 
unique human ability to think and couumnicate creatively_ 
Language, in addition to reflecting this unique human 
. ability, also reflects the world-view or mental patterns of 
a particular linguistic group. 	Thus, man is capable of 
being creative within the patterns and structures of his 
own language. 	The patterns, structures, and grammar 
64 
65 
of his language are historically and culturally relative, 
but the way he uses and creatively transforms his 
language will be parallel to the variation that man 
is able to bring about in any language. 	Thus, the 
ability to generate alternative phrases and to transform 
the order of words and phrases is not unique and 
particular to any one language. 	It is a universal 
ability of man and a universal characteristic of 
human language. 	This makes Chomsky's emphasis upon 
universal grammar compatible with theories of linguistic 
universality. 	Particular languages may be linguistically 
relative in the world views they reflect, but how they 
are generated and transformed in creative language use is 
analogous and parallel to the creativity that is 
reflected in any human language " (pp.42-43). 
The triteness of Den Ouden's argument is breathtaking. 
Languages differ in their surface structures ("patterns and 
structures of language") but share a capacity to generate 
alternative phrases and transform word orders. 	This latter 
capacity is labelled "creativity in language". 
It should be obvious that Den Ouden has missed the 
point in both the arguments for linguistic relativity and 
the arguments for universals in language. 
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Linguistic relativity, in any useful sense of the 
phrase, relates to semantic differences as expressed by the 
lexicon of a language (Lyons, 1968, p.432). 	It is even 
conceivable that it suggests no more than Chomsky does in 
putting forward the notion of "substantive universals" 
whereby a language selects from a limited number of possible 
phonological, syntactic and semantic features . 
Linguistic universals are the formal universals 
which Chomsky suggested are shared by all languages, such 
as "structure-dependence" (Chomsky, 1972, p.61). 	However, 
although they relate to the generation of alternative 
expressions such as active to passive, declarative to 
interrogative, etc., and thus account for paraphrase, 
this is not what Chomsky means by creativity or what Den 
Ouden has meant by it up until this point. When a language 
user is required to produce an utterance appropriate to a 
particular context, he may utter an active or a passive but 
in either case, the creativity lies in the appropriateness 
of the meaning. 	In other words, creativity is a semantic 
matter, and the ability to produce alternative syntactic forms 
is incidental. 
Den Ouden next turns to Chomsky's own work in order 
to detail the linguistic evidence for his view of human nature. 
He states that Chomsky "describes his own theories as generative 
and transformational granuitar. 	The word 'generative' symbolises 
the human ability to select or generate novel expressions"- (p.44) 
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The imprecision of this description makes it 
difficult to decide whether Den Ouden is correctly representing 
Chomsky's views. 	Certainly, Chomsky has emphasized that by 
generative, he means the production of syntactic sequences. 
It is a mathematical formulation of the productive capacity 
of this device 	(Chomsky, 1957, 1965). 
Such a description is difficult to relate to 
Den Ouden's use of "symbolize" or to his concentration on 
"novel expressions". 	He explicates "generative" by using 
"generate" in the explanation. 	It is, therefore, distinctly 
possible that Den Ouden does not understand what he is 
talking about. 
His discussion of Chomsky's theories focuses largely 
on the work of Katz (1971). 	Den Ouden is most interested 
in the characterisation of discourse as the exchange of 
novel utterances, and that despite the novel sequences, meaning 
appears to be instant for both speakers. 	Both are able to 
produce and comprehend constructions which the other has 
not heard before. 
Here Den Ouden has touched one of the springs of 
the generative model of grammar. But that is not to say 
that the argument is settled, for despite the lack of ref-
erence to them by Den Ouden, alternative explanations of 
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the fecundity of language do exist. 	Hockett's (1968) 
"analogy", and some psycholinguistic evidence (Slobin, 1979) 
suggest that certain problem-solving strategies may 
account for the capacity to understand novel utterances. 
The point is that Den Ouden accepts uncritically 
the claims of Chomskian theory. 	Merely accepting the 
fact that speakers produce and comprehend novel utterances 
is not enough. 	To relegate it to a mystery (Chamsky, 1976) 
is an evasion of responsibility, 	Den Ouden, when he gets 
Chamskian theory right, shares in that evasion, 
Further, "novel utterances" is a description which 
requires explanation and definition, 	The novelty of the 
utterance may lie in the many facets of language - syntactic, 
semantic, social, or a combination, 	It cannot be assumed that 
the description is clear in its own right; devoid of context, 
it can be made into many things. 	But the context which 
Den Ouden supplies suggests that he is only concerned with 
its syntactic novelty, or more precisely, surface structure 
variations. 
The universal structures of language, Den Ouden 
says ChoMsky says, is the phrase. 	The phrase is capable of 
combining with other phrases in many ways and this is true of 
all languages; 
"If all human beings structure their languages in 
phrases, then there must be a common structuring 
capacity that produces phrases in all languages " (p.55). 
If we accept the psychological and linguistic 
reality of the phrase, then we do not necessarily have to 
accept it as a language universal; in some way, it may be 
a perceptual or cognitive universal. 	In any case, there 
are alternative plausible explanations which Den Ouden 
ignores. 	His purpose is to point to what humanity has 
in common; and a phrase-structure universal suits his 
requirements because it allows a description of creativity 
which has been hinted at before but never entirely made 
explicit until this point: 
"Structure is present in language and languages and 
insofar as they can be used to communicate and to 
produce intelligibility and understanding, languages 
assume the form of phrases. 	Yet, within the necessary ' 
structuring of phrases, there is freedom and variability: 
The sequence of a group of phrases can be changed or 
• rearranged. 	Words and phrases can be added and deleted. 
Phrases can be conjoined and embedded. 	Very simply, 
alternative meaning and order can be generated through 
transformation alternatives. 
\‘, Through the vast, if not infinite, possibilities for 
linguistic conjunction, rearrangement and embedding, 
language exhibits the boundless horizons of human 
creativity•" (p.56). 
Very simply, Den Ouden's conception of creativity 
is rule-governed creativity which is the formal capacity 
of a grammar' togenerate alternative surface structures 
from a common deep structure. 	As such, it is susceptible 
the same attacks which have been brought against Chomsky. 
And whatever the accuracy of such a description of a grammar, 
it is misleading to name it "creativity", since it is a 
precise and specified syntactic capacity of the generating 
device; it does not in any way extend or negate the 
limits of the device and although it is highly productive, 
it is "creative" in only the most trivial and mechanical 
of senses. 
It is difficult to pin Den Ouden down to a 
particular conception with any degree of accuracy. 
Despite his explicit conception of creativity as the formal 
devices of grammar which produce superficially distinct 
sentences, he continues to hint at a semantic content to 
his description. 	For instance: 
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"If it is possible for the human mind to generate 
and transform ideas and linguistic expressions, 
then both in grammar and in epistemology this must 
be taken into account" 	(p.56) ; 
and: 
"Further evidence for the validity of generative and 
transformational grammar can be found in the 
necessary movement from surface description to deep 
structure or semantic analysis " (p.57). 
However, it seems likely that Den Ouden's 
continual vagueness and lack of clarity is obfuscating 
the fact that he is concerned only with syntactic creativity 
or rule-governed creativity. 	Suggestions that "the human 
mind ... generates3 and transformrs1 ideas" (p.56) 
are once-off statements left dangling without further 
explanation and are presumably the result of Den Ouden's 
intuitions regarding the relation between thought and 
language. 
4. Conclusion. 
With a few exceptions (Bouveresse and perhaps 
Lamb and Chafe), discussion of creativity and language has 
71 
72 
centred on 	the rule-governed (or syntactic) creativity 
first expounded by Chomsky. 	The motivation for this 
discussion has been the attempt to account for the obvious 
flexibility of any language as demonstrated in Even the 
simplest dialogue. 	However, it has resulted in an 
emphasis on structural-syntactic aspects rather than semantic 
contributions. 
Rule-governed creativity is largely a misnomer, 
since this formal type of creativity is a mechanical function 
of the language system. 	It is built into the system through 
recursive devices such as co-ordination and subordination, 
and emphasizes the point that the system is capable of 
generating alternative structures or sequences which may be 
semantically identical. 	Rule-governed creativity is the 
capacity to generate a large, perhaps infinite, variety of 
syntactic sequences. 	It is creative only in the sense 
that it may be infinitely productive; it is infinitely 
productive because it is a mechanical device programmed 
to be infinitely productive. 
' Occasionally, other notions of creativity have 
surfaced, and usually these relate either to the fact 
that a speaker produces a variety of utterances which 
are usually appropriate . (pragMatic creativity) or to the 
fact that a speaker can break the rules of grammar and 
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still be understood, in fact, understood better than 
he might have been had he not broken these specific rules of 
grammar (semantic creativity). 	It may be that these 
two notions, often only vaguely referred to, may be 
related and linked. 
It is, therefore, relevant to examine whether 
these notions have been at all developed elsewhere in 
the literature. 
4. THE THEORY OF METAPHOR. 
1. Introduction.  
The creative capacity of language has been 
called upon in many investigations of language and 
language use. 	One aspect of the creative capacity of 
language which has received a great deal of attention 
is the study of metaphor. 	Metaphor in particular, and 
figurative language in general, have traditionally been 
singled out as presenting paradigms of creativity in 
language, largely because of the application in literary 
language. 	Often, metaphor (and figurative language) has 
been seen as the prerogative of creative writers in a way 
which has almost made metaphor their hallmark. 
Metaphor relates to this present study because 
it implies a non-conventional use of language, which has 
traditionally been referred to as creative. 	Further, it 
presents a well-explored area of language study which may 
have a more precise bearing on creativity in language. 
Mooij (1976) makes this point in the following way: 
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...one of the factors that make metaphors interesting 
and significant is that they provide a possibility of 
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extending the area of what can be expressed by means 
of language. 	Metaphors may help to cover new 
situations or to elucidate new aspects of already 
familiar ones. 	It would be incorrect to think 
exclusively of literary metaphors in this connection; 
in conversation such creative metaphors can be used, 
too, while many literary metaphors are not pre-eminently 
creative in the way referred to here " (p.9). 
There is much in the ordinary and specialised use 
of language which is non-literal. 	One aspect of non-literal 
language is figurative language, so called because it has 
as an identifying characteristic the use of figures of 
speech. 	Figures of speech are devices which are easy to 
exemplify but difficult to define. 	It is the intention here 
to avoid a detailed discussion of rhetoric and hence 
discussion of figures of speech will be confined to the 
particular devices generally referred to as metaphor and 
simile. 	The use of 'metaphor' to represent all figurative 
language or all figures of speech will be avoided. 
Metaphor and simile (and other figures) occur 
in ordinary language as well as in the specialized language 
used by writers. 	Traditionally, these figures find their 
most specialised application in poetry. 	However, for the 
purposes of this study, interest will focus on the general 
occurrence of figurative language, and no distinction will 
be drawn between its use in ordinary language and that in 
poetic language. 
It is almost impossible to provide a definition 
of metaphor or simile which is acceptable to everyone. 
A range of definitions is considered in the discussion 
below; let it suffice at this point to state that a metaphor 
implies a significance beyond the literal meaning of the 
words of the metaphor. 	It is precisely because the literal 
meaning is unlikely (impossible, implausible, etc.) that 
the reader is alerted to the presence of a metaphor. 
In some sense, similes aremore evident because of the 
formal markers 'like' or 'as', thereby patently implying a 
comparison of some sort. 	Questions as to whether metaphor 
is a comparison and how it relates to simile will be raised 
in the discussion below. 
It is assumed, for the present, that even if no 
acceptable definition is available, there is no disagreement. 
that metaphors exist,,and that most thoughtful readers can 
recognise at least some of them with some degree of 
accuracy. 	Broadly speaking, there is only disagreement about 
individual metaphors (and such disagreements may relate to 
particular definitions being employed), not , ,:bout whether 
'metaphors exist. 
/6 
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The study of metaphor has been undertaken by 
literary critics, philosophers, linguists and psycholinguists. 
These various approaches have all contributed new aspects to 
the phenomenon, although none can claim to have captured the 
phenomenon in any precise way. 	The various treatments differ 
widely; where a literary critic may consider metaphor as 
central to his concern, the linguist may dismiss it as an 
aberration of language or an offence against the rules of 
language. 	However, each approach has contributed to the 
others, so that a psycholinguistic approach may depend on 
the theoretical notions provided by literary criticsm 
(e.g. the way in which Pollio et al (1977) depends on 
Richards's(1936) vehicle and tenor). 
Recent research into metaphor is largely of two 
types: consideration of the theory of metaphor, and 
application of experimental procedures to determine its 
empirical aspects. 	These two types of research are clearly 
mutually dependent. 	However, both skirt the central issue 
of what the study of metaphor contributes to the understanding 
of language, and to the theories of language which have been 
constructed to date. 	The fundamental question is what. 
a theory of language must account for in view of the occurrence 
of figuratiye language and how the theory may be able to 
account for it. 
2. A Model of Metaphor. 
One of the most comprehensive treatments of 
the theory of metaphor is Mooij (1976) A Stucky of Metaphor. 
Unlike most other studies, this work provides a survey of 
the major theoretical work on the subject; its aim is to 
critically assess past and current efforts to provide a 
theoretical description of metaphor. 	It has the 
advantage of a wide reading of relevant subject-matter, 
and combines the literary, philosophical and linguistic 
traditions in the field. 	This point is emphasized since 
many of the accepted studies on metaphor are remarkably 
lacking in any perspective on previous and contemporary 
studies of metaphor. 
Mooij (1976) provides a critical analysis of 
various theoretical approaches to metaphor, and is able to 
provide a conceptual framework within which most theories 
can be approximately placed. 	He grapples with the difficult 
task of determining what theorists actually mean, for the 
field is strewn with inexact terminology and imprecise 
conceptualizations. 	What follows is a brief summary of 
Mooij's findings. 
A major distinction may be made between theories of 
metaphor which hold that a metaphor retains its original, 
literal reference and those which claim otherwise. 	The first 
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may be called dualistic theories and the second monistic  
theories. 
(It must be kept in mind that any theory of 
metaphor is ultimately based on more fundamental conceptions 
derived from fields such as epistemology and hermeneutics. 
In fact, a theory of metaphor is directly dependent on a 
theory of reference, and any distinction between theories 
of metaphor may relate to differences in the use of the 
concept 'reference'.) 
"On the one hand, some theories hold that words, if 
used metaphorically, keep their normal referential 
capacity, thus retaining a reference to elements of 
their literal extension. 	Besides, they may carry a 
second reference because of their special (metaphorical) 
function. 	On the other hand, some theories hold that 
words, if used metaphorically, lose their normal referential 
capacity, but may get another reference instead " (p.31). 
This distinction is predominantly of degree, and 
a particular theory may be strongly or weakly dualistic 
or monistic. 
Dualist theories are generally of two varieties; 
comparison theories and interactionist theories. 	Henle (1958) 
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is an example of the former, and Campbell (1975) presents 
a linguistically based version of the comparison theory. 
Richards (1936) and Black (1962) are examples of the 
interactionist theory. 
Comparison theorists hold that: 
"The metaphorical words in a sentence refer not only 
figuratively to one situation (that is, the literal 
subject-matter of the sentence), but also literally 
to another, this second situation serving as an icon 
of the first. 	It is only through the literal reference 
of a metaphorical expression that its figurative 
reference comes into being. 	Indeed, Henle is committed 
to the idea that metaphor consists in an analogy 
between different things or situations " (p.30). 
Interactionist theorists hold: 
"(1) that a metaphorical sentence has (at least) 
two subjects; (2) that the finding of one of these 
two subjects (the subsidiary subject S2) depends upon 
picking up the normal referential meaning of the 
metaphorical word(s); (3) that the other subject 
(the main subject Si) is conceived in terms of S2 so 
that the resulting meaning of the sentence involves a 
certain blending of the two subjects " (p.35). 
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Monistic theories of metaphor:: 
",..explain the meaning of metaphorical expressions on 
the basis of part of the meaning of these words in 
literal use. 	This literal meaning is analyzed as a 
conglomerate or structure of meaningful elements 
or meaningful components. 	In metaphorical use these 
are only partly considered to be relevant, in such 
a way that normal referential capacity is eliminated 
and a reference to the literal extension is no longer 
present " (p.36). 
Monistic theories are generally of three varieties: 
connotation theories, (M. C. Beardsley (1962) and R. J. Matthews 
(1971)), substitution theories and the supervenience theory 
(perhaps D. Bickerton (1960)). 
Connotation theorists hold that: : 
.,.on the basis of new verbal combinations and with 
a view to the properties of the respective referents, 
new connotations develop: properties can be made, 
• temporarily or permanently, into meanings " (p.30). 
Substitution-theories tend to be the traditional 
theories of metaphor, found in the early texts on rhetoric: 
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"The view that a metaphorical word just means what 
another word, viz, the proper (literal) word which 
has been replaced by the metaphorical word, would mean 
in the same context and situation t' (p.36). 
The supervenience theorists hold that there is no 
rational explanation of the metaphorical use of an 
expression. 	Bickerton's (1969) theory has some similarities 
with the kind of connotation theory described by Beardsley 
(1972),in that Bickerton's "assigned attributes" (the 
features belonging to words which convey a characteristic 
attribute, e.g. ''iron" ="hardness") are very similar to 
Beardsley's "connotations". 	However, Bickerton ultimately 
believes that words do not have fixed and definite meanings 
(Bickerton p.36), and that the attributes assigned to words 
are entirely arbitrary (e.g.  "iron" rather than'"steel" for 
"hardness'). 	Metaphors are ultimately left unexplained 
by such a theory. 
Although Mooij considers a range of arguments 
for and against the various theories, his -conc'ern is not to 
establish one particular theory as 'correct". 	Rather, he 
is concerned to extract from each theory its explanatory 
power, and weld the results together into a prolegomen, on to 
a model of metaphor. 	He openly favours the interactionist 
view butequally strongly defends the connotation view 
against recent attacks. 	This ecumenical effort produces a 
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tentative model which incorporates many of the strengths 
of these two theories. 	At the same time, Mooij has clarified 
the conceptual pea-soup which has clogged the theory of 
metaphor, and provided some indications as to where empirical 
research should be heading. 
His model of metaphor is interesting for another 
reason. 	Given that the empirical phenomena upon which 
theories of metaphors have been constructed remain undefined, 
the model provides an approach to dealing with imprecise 
and diffuse phenomena. 	Mooij does provide a working 
definition but it is tentative and open-ended, and delimits 
the extension of metaphor rather than defines it: 
"One or more words W used in an utterance (of one 
or more sentences) can be classed as metaphorical 
if, and only if: 
"(a) the linguistic context and/or the non-linguistic 
situation (inclusive of speaker, circumstances, 
audience, etc.) make it clear that the utterance 
is substantially about a certain subject, A. 
"(b) The words W, whose metaphoricalness is under 
discussion, have a field of literal descriptive 
meaning, F, determined by semantical conventions 
(often relative to the context and/or the 
situation). 
"(c) These words W are used in the utterance in such 
a way that at least part of their function seems 
to be a direct description, characterization, 
indication, etc. of certain aspects of A. 
"(d) Although A and F may be only vaguely circumscribed, 
it has to be clear that the aspects of A meant 
in (c) do not show the features F. 
"(e) Nevertheless, the utterance is not to be 
interpreted as simply false, inappropriate, or 
nonsensical (which it would be on the basis of a 
literal reading of W), because it is.understandable 
as a significant contribution to the discourse 
about A. 	That is, the metaphorical words do not 
only seem to give information about A, according 
to (c), but they actually help to do so. 	This 
requires a variant reading of W which, however, does 
not depend on a shift based on relations of 
contiguity (between cause and effect, vessel and 
contents, part and whole, and the like) or on 
specific factors like exaggeration or reversal 
of meaning " (p.26). 
Mooij adds two qualifications. 	Firstly, this 
'delimitation' of metaphor is not confined to statements; 
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questions, commands or exclamations are not excluded. 
Secondly, in order to include negatives (especially of 
false sentences), he adds the following codicils: 
"(d') Or the relevant aspects of A show the features 
in F in a quite trivial way. 
"(e') In case the utterance is trivial, though 
irreproachable, it is nonetheless not to be regarded 
as a useless item in communication. 	It can be 
given a significant content, e.g. as a useful reminder 
or a suggestive hint, by a variant reading of W" (p.27). 
Mooij's model of metaphor is as follows: 
Metaphor may be classified along three dimensions, 
each of which provides an aspect relevant to how the metaphor 
works. 
The first dimension is reference: "the dimension 
of the strength of the reference of the metaphorical 
expression to its literal extension" (p.173). 
The second dimension is conception: "the dimension 
of the re-organization of features of the principal subject 
because of its metaphorical description or indication" (p.174); 
and "along this dimension is estimated the degree in which 
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our conception of the principal subject is reorganized 
(albeit temporarily or experimentally)" (p.174). 
The third dimension is distance: "the dimension 
of the distance, or the remoteness, felt to exist between 
the principal subject and the literal extension of the 
metaphorical word" (p.174). 
The three dimensions indicated in R, C and D value 
for any particular metaphor. 	From Mooij's examples, Table 1 
may be derived. 	Obviously, the placement of any particular 
metaphor on each dimension may be highly idiosyncratic and 
difficult to agree on. 	However, any schema of metaphors must 
commence with the metaphors upon which agreement can be reached. 
If necessary, the schema can be modified in the light of 
later discussion regarding controversial metaphors. 
The model sheds some light on the concepts 
discussed earlier by Mooij. 	The monist theories account 
for metaphors which have a low R value but are not able to 
accommodate metaphors with high R values, - These low R value 
metaphors ('monist' metaphors) live comfortably with a high 
or low D value. 	However, it seems that they require, of 
necessity, a low C value, 
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TABLE 1 
Model Some tetaphotS graded by the Mooij (1976) . 
Example 
"Man is a wolf" high high high 
"The Rhine is a sewer" high high• high 
"Wrapped in thought" low low high 
"The bullets flew about their 
ears" low low low 
If the R value is high, then dualism is needed 
to account for such metaphors ('dualist' metaphors). 
Dualist metaphors may have a high C value, in which case 
the interactionist theory is able to account for this. 
If they have a low C value, then a comparison theory is 
sufficient to account for them. 	The D dimension does 
not have any effect on whether a dualist metaphor requires 
an interactionist or a comparison theory. 
On the basis of such a three-dimensional model, 
Mooij is able to ascribe particular types of metaphor to 
a broad location. 	For instance, Wheelwright's (1962) 
diaphor: high R, low C, high D; and Brooks' (1965) 
paradoxical metaphors: high R, low C, mid D. 	In addition, 
interaction metaphors are shown to be the central 
metaphorical phenomena. 
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Finally, it is worth noting that these three 
dimensions relate to different approaches which have been 
taken to the problem of metaphor. 	The R dimension 
relates largely to linguistics and the philosophy of 
language. 	The C dimension relates to the comprehension 
and interpretation of the metaphor, that is, psycholinguistics 
and the psychology of language. 	The D dimension relates 
to the practice and use of metaphors; it presupposes a 
deliberate manipulation of the distance between the subject 
and the literal extension of the metaphor; hence, it 
relates to poetics and the creative use of language. 
Mooij also briefly considers the function of 
metaphors and touches directly on the reason for their 
inclusion in the present study: 
"Why should metaphors be so widespread, so useful, 
so (practically) indispensable as they have proved to 
be? 	The same question arises in connection with the 
phenomenon of individual users of language applying 
metaphors extempore in order to express some notion 
or other without a resultant extension of the 
standard idiom of the language concerned. 	This 
happens in conversation, in propaganda speeches, in 
scientific expositions for the general public, in 
philosophical texts and in literature. 	What is the 
background of this?" (p.12). 
Aspects of the use of metaphor are summarised 
briefly by Mooij (p.12 ff) 
(1) Metaphor allows language to be extended to cope
•with novel situations for which there is no 
existing term. Cm n classical rhetoric, 'catachresis' 
resolving 'inopia'.) 
(2) Metaphors work because the denotation and connotation 
of the literal expression are carried over into the 
metaphor in some way. 	(Whether the literal 
expression continues to hang about depends on which 
theory is adhered to.) 
(3) Metaphors are an economic device of language and 
make unnecessary an infinitely large vocabulary, 
albeit that they run the risk of misinterpretation. 
Generally, there are cues to assist in noticing 
and comprehending metaphors. 
(4) Metaphors are like the (conceptual) models of 
science which assist in exploring new situations. 
They may be fundamental to our struggle to interpret 
the world and certainly aid this struggle at 
various times. 
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(5) Metaphors may express new insights into 
existing situations. 	As a metaphor interprets 
and thereby constructs or structures a new 
situation, so it destroys an existing construction. 
Obviously, these broad outlines of the function of 
metaphor are generalised and impressionistic, but they provide 
both the inspiration for their study and the goal of 
explicating such functions. 
3. The Philosophy of Metaphor. 
P. Ricoeur in The Rule of the Metaphor (1978a) presents 
a theory of metaphor which is more complex in conception 
and less verifiable in its empirical claims than the theory 
provided by Mooij. 	Ricoeur's study of metaphor provides 
an interdisciplinary width and a theoretical depth to which 
the present study can barely give justice. 	His aim is to 
write a phenomenology of metaphor and such a scope is not 
immediately pertinent to the study of creativity in language. 
However, in passing, Ricoeur discusses various notions which 
relate intimately to such a study. 
Essentially, Ricoeur agrees in broad terms with 
the distinction between monistic and dualistic theories of 
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metaphor. 	He uses a different terminology and, more 
importantly, he attempts to ascribe a theoretical foundation 
to this distinction. 	For Ricoeur, the distinction lies 
in the distinction between semiotics and semantics; 
Semiotics treats the word as the basic unit of meaning s 
and considers it to be a sign which names a referent in the 
real world. 	Semantics treats the sentence (or statement) 
as the basic unit of meaning and considers it to provide 
the complete meaning. 	Metaphor cannot be accounted for 
by semiotic theory (except for 'dead' metaphors) since that 
is derived from a theory of meaning based on naming; rather, 
to be complete and account for live and novel metaphors, a 
semantics of discourse is required, in which the sentence 
is the unit of meaning, and meaning is a process of 
predication: 
"Metaphor is an act of predication rather than of 
denomination. (Ricoeur, 1978b, p,158), 
• 	This theoretical conception is the foundation 
for the distinction between monistic and dualistic theories 
of metaphor, between theories of substitution and of 
interaction: 
.... the opposition at the level of metaphor, between 
a substitution theory and an interaction theory, 
reflects the deeper opposition at the level of basic 
linguistic postulates between a semiotic monism 
(which rules the semantics of the word and of the 
sentence) and a dualism of semiotics and semantics, 
where the semantics of the sentence is built on 
principles distinct from all operations with respect 
to signs." (1978a, 13,103). 
Within the framework of his view of the development 
of the theory of metaphor, Ricoeur reviews many of the 
theorists who were discussed by Mooij - Richards, Black, 
Beardsley, Henle, Konrad, etc. 	However, he adds one theorist, 
not mentioned by Mooij, who is directly concerned with 
innovation in language. 	Ullman (1967) provides a semantic 
theory which is within the parameters delineated by 
de Saussure; it is a structural semantics confined to a 
semantics of the word (lexical semantics). 
Ricoeur (1978 a)' 	outlines three theses which 
limit such a semantics: 
(1) lexical semantics inherits all the problems of 
defining "word", e.g. the phonological demarcation 
of the word, the meaning of function - words, etc. 
(2) the meaning of a word is both its name and its 
sense; meaning is "a reciprocal and reversible 
relationship between the name and the sense" 
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(Ulmann, p.67). 	This is rarely a one-to-one 
relationship (i.e. synonymy, homonymy and polysemy), 
and every name has an 'associative field' which 
brings relationships based on contiguity and 
resemblance to either the name or the sense. 
(3) historical linguistics accounts for changes in 
meaning by accounting for the Causes of the change. 
It is the notion of polysemy which is of interest 
to Ricoeur. 	Polysemy (or lexical ambiguity) is the essence 
of descriptive (synchronic) semantics. 	Its strength is 
that it allows a lexical system which is economical and 
flexible, saved from confusion by the contexts of the words. 
Upon polysemy is built Ullman's theory of change of meaning 
and, as a consequence, his theory of metaphor and innovation. 
New meanings result from creative intuitions. 
Such meanings are arrived at suddenly, without intermediate 
stages; Ricoeur quotes Ullman as follows: 
"metaphor issues wholly formed from an 'act of 
• immediate apperception'" (Ricoeur, 1978a 1,p,116), 
The mechanisms which allow this innovation are dependent 
upon the nature of the lexical system, that is the indeterminate 
boundaries of the system ('associative field'),and the capacity 
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of words to accumulate meanings. 	This latter capacity 
makes change of meaning possible, whilst the former capacity 
defines its operation. 	Associative fields are created on 
the basis of contiguity or resemblance. 	Association by 
resemblance of sense is inetaphor. 
•Ullman's theory of metaphor is thus a psychological 
theory in the sense that the principle of association of 
resemblance is a psychological notion. 	Ricoeur comments: 
"This psychological mediation between semantics and 
rhetoric deserves attention. 	It carries very positive 
benefits, no matter what our later reservations may be. 
In the first place, a bridge is constructed between the 
individual activity of speech and the social character 
of language. 	The associative fields provide this 
mediation. 	They belong to the language, and they 
present the same character of latency as the 'storehouse 
of language' in de Saussure; at the same time, they 
demarcate a field of play for an activity that remains 
individual since it is an effort at expression: 'Whether 
it has to do with filling a real void, avoiding a verbal 
taboo, giving free play to the emotions or the urge 
to express oneself, the associative fields are what will 
provide the primary material for innovation.'" 
(1978a, p,118), 
The whole lexical system, however, is dependent 
on context, and therein lies its greatest weakness. 
Ultimately, Ullman must go beyond the word, beyond the 
name-sense dichotomy to the context, in order to disambiguate 
or simply to confer meaning. 	A semantics of the word is 
therefore incomplete, although the notion of polysemy has 
contributed directly to the theory of metaphor by breaking 
any suggestion of a one-to-one link between name and sense. 
As Ricoeur concludes: 
"A semantic innovation is a way of responding in a 
creative fashion to a question presented by things. 
In a certain discourse situation, in a given social 
milieu and at a precise moment, something seeks to 
be said that demands an operation of speech, speech 
working on language, that brings words and things 
face to face. 	The final outcome is a new description 
of the universe of representations." (1978a, p.125). 
For the remainder of The Rule of Metaphor, Ricoeur 
develops a hermeneutics based on discourse analysis, in 
which metaphor is the central concept: 
"Metaphor presents itself as a strategy of discourse 
that, while preserving and developing the creative 
power of language, preserves and develops the heuristic
•power wielded by fiction " (1978a, p.6). 
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"Metaphor is the rhetorical process by which discourse 
unleashes the power that certain fictions have to 
describe reality " (p.7). 
... the 'place' of metaphor, its most intimate and 
ultimate abode, is neither the name, nor the sentence, 
nor even discourse, but the copula of the verb to be. 
The metaphorical 'is' at once signifies both 'is not' 
and 'is like'. 	If this is really so, we are allowed 
to speak of metaphorical truth, but in an equally 
'tensive' sense of the word !truth' 	(p.7). 
Elsewhere (Ricoeur, 1978b) 	he attempts a 
similar task in respect of the psychology of metaphor, where 
he is concerned to establish a theory of imagination and of 
feeling: 
... there is a structural analogy between the 
cognitive, the imaginative and the emotional components 
of the complete metaphorical act and that the metaphorical 
process draws its concreteness and completeness from this 
structural analogy and this complementary functioning.." 
(1978b, p.159). 
For present purposes, it is Ricoeur's 
explication of the theoretical foundation of the monist/ 
dualist dichotomy which is relevant. 	It provides an 
extension of the model developed by Mooij (1976) and 
emphasizes that the use of metaphor for innovation is 
firmly dependent on the dualist conception of metaphor. 
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5. THE PSYCHOLINGUISTICS OF METAPHOR. 
1. Psycho linguistic Developments. 
Possibly the most virile developments in the 
exploration of metaphor in recent years haie been in the 
psycholinguistic and psychological study of metaphor. 
Much of this has grown in response to the work of Black 
(1962) and in the wake of the Chomskyan revolution in 
linguistics. 	Some of the major contributions and 
contributors to this development are described below, 
each presenting a review of research to date from a 
particular perspective. 
Pollio et al (1977) represents a progress 
report on the work done by the Metaphor Study Group at 
the University of Tennessee. 	Their research has a strong 
psycho-analytic and educational interest, and the theory 
of metaphor is a prelude to techniques of therapy and 
teaching. 	From a theoretical point of view, their work 
is somewhat inadequate. 	There are major omissions in 
the discussion of the theory of metaphor, whilst the 
theorists quoted are by no means representative of the 
discipline. 	This results in a rambling discussion of 
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disparate ideas, centring on the notion of "tension" 
in metaphor (from Wheelwright (1959)), which is a 
sophisticated development of the Richards model of metaphor. 
This interactionist model has a strong appeal to psychologists, 
possibly because it is conceptually divisible and easily 
categorised into mechanical parts (e.g. Osborn and Ehninger 
(1962). 
Pollio et al. summarise as follows: 
"The method of metaphor, then, comes down to one 
of simultaneous interaction where the elements 
paired must form a new whole having unique properties 
of selective emphasis and contrast. 	Only if such a 
new gestalt emerges from the combination is it 
possible for a figure to bring about its varied 
effect " (p.31). 
Billow (1977) provides a similar theoretical 
approach to Pollio et al. (1977), in that he centres on the 
interactionist model of metaphor, and he arrives at this 
po§ition through the same theorists, i.e. Richards, 
Wheelwright and Black. 	Again, the discussion is very 
limited and highly selective, and such an unstructured 
overview of the theory of metaphor is unlikely to generate 
hypotheses of any fertility which the psychologist is 
presumably looking for. 
However, Billow does include the 'metaphor as 
polysemy" view of Ullman, which other theorists ignore, 
and emphasizes metaphor's relevance to creativity, 
suggesting, amongst others, the following points: . 
1. Metaphor is "the creative response in miniature " 
(p.83). 
2. Metaphor satisfies the four criteria of 
creativity, i.e. unusualness, appropriateness, 
innovation and condensation of meaning (p.83). 
3. Metaphor may be used to identify creative persons . (p.83) 
4. Metaphor has a heuristic value in both science 
and arts (p.83). 
The most thorough and searching reviewof theory 
and research into metaphor as a psychological phenomenon 
is presented by Ortony et al (1978b). 	This paper 
echoes the criticisms made above in respect of the lack 
of coherence and rigour in the theorising upon which the 
research is nominally based. 	The intention of the paper 
is to rectify this deficiency. 
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Ortony first distinguishes between various 
theories. 	He rejects the substitution theory on the 
grounds that it is simply not able to account for any 
but the simplest metaphors. 	The remaining theories 
discussed are the comparison theory and the interactionist 
theory. 	In other words, one monist theory is rejected 
on the grounds of explanatory weakness, and the remaining 
theories are both dualist theories. 	Presumably, this 
deficiency arises from a failure to recognise the theoretical 
distinction between the monist and dualist theories. 
This may account for the failure to discuss the strongest 
of all monist theories (the connotationist theory),even 
though it is represented in the research (Bickerton (1969), 
and Cometa and Eson (1978), with the latter presenting a 
Piagetian view of metaphor). 
Since Ortony limits the discussion to dualist 
theories, he naturally slips into the terminology 
devised by Richards and elaborated by Black and Wheelwright; 
that is, metaphor is analysed into tenor, vehicle and ground.. 
The difference between the interactionist -theory and the 
comparison theory is attributed to the relationship between 
the tenor and the vehicle. 	The latter type does not move 
beyond the mere juxtaposition of the two, whilst the former 
defines a special intertwining or interpenetration of the 
101 
vehicle and the tenor which is described as a tension 
between the two. 	Ortony tentatively concludes that 
the interactionist theory is more powerful since it may 
absorb the comparison theory,whilst the latter would have 
difficulty accounting for some interactionist metaphors 
(for an attempt, see Perrine (1971)). 
2. Metaphors and Language. 
Probably the most useful contribution to the 
American tradition of research into metaphor is the 
collection of papers entitled Metaphor and Thought  
(Ortony 1979). 	This volume represents a vigorous 
assault on the problem of metaphor, signalling a renewal 
of interest in the topic by linguists. 	Of interest to 
the present study are those contributions which are at 
least peripherally concerned with the implications which 
the study of metaphor holds for the creativity - of 
language. 
Ortony (1979), in his introduction, characterises 
two differing approaches to the study of language and, 
indeed, the study of knowledge and cognition. 	Firstly, 
there is the tradition which he calls "non-constructivistn o 
which sees language as a medium capable of directly describing 
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reality. 	Secondly, there is the tradition which he 
calls "constructivist",which sees language as contributing, 
along with perception, memory, etc., to a mental construction 
we call reality' 
"It seems preferable, however, to attempt to relate 
two alternative approaches to metaphor—metaphor 
as an essential characteristic of the creativity of 
language; and metaphor as deviant and parasitic 
upon normal usage---to a more fundamental and 
pervasive difference of opinion about the relationship 
between language and the world " (p.2). 
From this position, Ortony develops two varying 
approaches to metaphor. 	In the constructivist approach 
(more thoroughly represented in the volume) ; 
"meaning has to be constructed, rather than merely 
'read-off', . 	The use of language is an 
essentially creative activity, as is its comprehension ". 
(p.2). 
The non-constructivist position can only treat 
meaning as given, and non-literal use of language, therefore, as 
the violation of linguistic rules. 
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This distinction is developed in a slightly 
different way and using different means by Reddy (1979). 
He proposes two metaphors which he uses to describe how 
language users are biased towards describing their. 
language and the cognitive acts implied in language. 
Reddy presents a host of evidence to demonstrate that when 
English speakers talk about talking and thinking, they 
automatically use expressions which imply one particular 
view of how language and thought work. 	The 'frame of mind", 
or framework, which thus becomes evident is called "conduit 
metaphor": 
evidence suggests that English has a preferred 
framework for conceptualizing communication and can 
bias thought process towards this framework, even 
though nothing more than common sense is necessary 
to devise a different, more accurate, framework " (p.285). 
The conduit metaphor implies that thoughts, feelings, 
ideas, and other mental phenomena are contained in the 
signals which pass between language users.' One speaker 
puts the thought into a signal and the other speaker unpacks 
it. 	Reddy provides 140 examples of standard descriptions 
of mental phenomena which imply the conduit metaphor for 
communication, as opposed to 30-40 examples which are 
metaphorically neutral or imply a different metaphor. 
To counter his own thinking about thinking being 
biased by the conduit metaphor, Reddy proposes the 
"toolmaker's paradigm" which is described in a delightful 
way. 	The basic point is that meaningful communication is 
the result of some hard work at both the production and 
comprehension ends of the task. 	Mental phenomenaare 
converted into signals not automatically, but through an 
act of construction by the producer and re-construction by 
the coMprehender. 	Meaning is therefore created from the 
signal and does not reside within the signal. Words do 
not mean; only people mean (of de Saussure, 1959) - . 
Now, the implications for.a theory of metaphor 
are obvious, although they are not spelled out by Reddy. 	The 
conduit metaphor may be seen as a different way of 
characterising the non-constructivist position described 
by Ortony. 	It results in a view of metaphor as deviation, 
as a misuse of the conventions of language. 	It directly 
leads to a categorisation of metaphor as an attempt to 
transfer lexico-semantic features from vehicle to topic; 
that is, the connotationist view. 
If the toolmaker's paradigm is a more accurate 
description of what language users do when they use language, 
then metaphor is a variation in the degree of difficulty 
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of the reconstruction task. 	Indeed, metaphor thus 
reflects the difficulty of the original construction task, 
which was motivated by the need to express something. 
novel (by 'novel" is meant not only novel to the producer, 
which may be familiar to the comprehender, but also novel . 
in some absolute sense ofunever-constructed-before" 
The initial difficulty in encoding the novel mental 
construct into a linguistic signal is reflected in the 
consequent difficulty in decoding the signal and recreating 
the novel construct. 	The novelty of the construct 	will 
ensure that the reconstruction process can only be tentative 
without . any guarantee of accuracy. 	As the metaphor's 
meaning and form become_ more familiar, so it becomes more 
easily understood, and may eventually approximate the status 
of, _idiom. 	In this sense, using metaphorical language 
is only different in degree from using non-metaphorical 
language. 
But the implications of Reddy's distinction between 
given and constructed meaning for the notion of linguistic 
creativity are equally interesting. 	If 'meaning is 
constructed from linguistic signals, rather than automatically 
given, then we need to distinguish between the act of 
creativity in arriving at a novel mental construct: ,--- 
as a hitherto unperceived (unconstructed?) relationship -== 
and its expression in a non-mental medium such as a 
linguistic signal. 	Presumably, a poet-painter such as 
William Blake would have the choice of which form of 
expression he uses to communicate his novel mental 
constructs. 	Whether a metaphor or a drawing is used, 
the act of expressionis an act of creativity separate 
from the act of invention. 
Clearly, there is a good deal more to the 
distinction between thought and language. 	In one sense, 
the two are impossible to extricate and treat separately; 
any attempt to do so will founder simply because not enough 
is known about the nexus between the two, or, indeed, about 
each separately. 	In another sense, there is a common- 
sense distinction which is intuitively made, drawn 
in terms of private versus public domains. 
For the purpose of the present discussion, a 
distinction is drawn but not defended. 	It is necessary, 
since it is important for present purposes to make a distinction 
between the private mental phenomenon and the linguistic 
signal which is used to make it public. 	Again, the extent 
of the interaction between the two is left' moot. 	But even 
if it could be proven that, say, the two are merely 
different manifestations of the one phenomenon and, therefore, 
not separable in terms of motivating cause, the distinction 
drawn here remains valid because no statement is made as 
to the exact relationship between the two. 
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In short, it is postulated, in accordance with 
intuition, that there are two separate phenomena , , 	If 
they are related, then the relationship is unstated, and is 
not pertinent to the use made of the distinction. 
From this point on, in Jily study, creativity 
in language is confined to semantic creativity as opposed 
to the creativity involved in producing a novel mental 
construct. 	Although this latter type of creativity is 
probably the traditional intention of the description, 
it relates to a different field of inquiry. 	Whatever 
medium or internal code it is carried out in (see Fodor, 
1976), it is not relevant to the present study. 
My initial conclusion is that metaphor is a 
paradigm of language use which is the result of a novel 
mental construct being encoded into a linguistic signal. 
It may be described as linguistically creative because 
although metaphorizing belongs to language, a metaphor is 
constructed by"breaking'some of the rules of language. 
Metaphor, paradoxically, is part of language use, but works 
by jpreaking some of the rules of language. 	Any rule-governed 
activity runs the risk of having its rules broken; in the 
case of metaphor, meaning is produced by breaking the 
rules. 
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This tentative conclusion begs further explanation, 
especially the notion of a "rule of language" and what it 
means to break such a thing. 
Ganz (1971) provides a detailed discussion of the notion 
of "rules". She makes a convincing case that the typical use of 
the word "rule" in linguistic discussion is non-technical and 
imprecise. 
The difficulty lies in the fact that any rigorous definition 
of the notion of the "rule" discredits a view, of language as a 
rule-directed or rule-guided activity. This is so because :- 
(a) not all the rules of language are knownand therefore it 
would be necessary to postulate a guiding or directing 
relationship based on unknown rules; any rigorous definition 
of the notion "rule" 1 precludes this possibility. 
(b) the description of a behavioaral regularity is not the 
same as the behavioural regularity. "Finding regularities 
about human behaviour might point to a similarity in the 
structure of people, but it need not imply that the 
description of the similarity is just what the similarity 
Is." (Ganz 1971, p. 110). 
1. E.g. "utterances and inscriptions called rules are 
appropriately adopted, prescriptive, conditional 
linguistic entities having no truth-value." 
(Ganz, 1971, p. 104). 
In this context, note the "appropriately adopted" 
requirement i.e. rules are explicit. 
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(c) any notion of "internalized rules" fails to account for 
all the facts since it does not and is not able to account 
for instances where people speak ungrammatically, i.e. 
break these internal rules. "Rules are such that they are, 
in principle at least, breakable. On the other hand, if 
this element of 'you are guided by unknown rules' is to be 
avoided, then the proponents of the 'internalist' rule-guided 
theory would have to explain Low it is that we are not guided 
by them at times. In other words,what breaks down when 
people don't speak grammatically." (Ganz, 1971, p.111). 
This is not to say that using language is not rule-like and 
rule-describable. Both are certainly true, but it is not tenable 
to describe using language as a rule-directed or rule-guided 
behaviour Csee Ganz (1971) for further discussion of these points). 
The theoretical Water has been muddied somewhat by the advent 
of. transformational generative Model's of language. In general 
terms, these are models based on "technical" rules, similar to 
the rules of formal logic: . 	• Their existence may have lent 
credence to the view of language as a rule-directed behaviour: 
Such "technical" rules tend to be well-defined mathematical entities 
of the form AB. 
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As Sampson (1973) points out, Chomsky in fact uses at 
least two "technical" types of rules. First, there are the rules 
whch relate to formations at the base "level" and which determine 
a particular set of possible sentence-representations. Second, 
there are the rules which define the relationship between related 
sentence-representations that occur at different levels (e.g. 
syntactic transformations, phonological rules). 
• Ganz (1971) takes linguists totask for not using the notion_ 
f "rules" properly. Sampson (1973) argues that, in fact, there 
is no reason why the linguist's:use and definition of "rule" 
should be identical to the philosopher's use and definition. 
Sampson Sees - a relationship between the two uses (mainly through 
the logicians` use of "formation" rules and "rules of inference") 
but certainly not equivalence. 
The TG grammarian's use of rules, then, may be nothing 
more than .a defined and specific use of a piece of terminology 
that is appropriate to his purpose of building a model of language. 
A philosopher such as Ganz may use that same piece of terminology 
differently. Difficulties arise when TG grammarians also use that 
piece of terminology in a loose, non-technical sense to talk 
about their model building activities. 
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However, the model of a language is not the same as a model 
of language using ability. Chomsky has emphasised this in the 
Past CChomsky, 1961, p. 7) and he has generally been careful to 
distinguish his well-defined technical use of rule from the more 
widespread non-technical use of rule, but nevertheless the notions 
have been confounded. The prevalent view continues to be that 
language is rule-directed and from here on such a description will 
be interpreted in a non-technical sense to mean that language is 
rule-like and rule-describable. A model of language (e.g. a TG 
grammar) is a description of a formal system which includes the 
technical notion of "rule" that is able Cto some extent) to predict 
the regularities of language behaviour. 
What then is the relationship between such models and the 
language user ? In one sense, this question is almost irrelevant 
to this inquiry, since it is the well-worn distinction between 
competence and performance, which we could not tackle here. In 
another sense, it lies at the heart of this inquiry in that the 
claims made here about creative language use points up inadequacies 
in the traditional models of language. That is, what language users 
do is not accounted for by the models. 
The Chomskian view holds that the rules of language (that is, 
of the model of language;- of the grammar) are :- 
"constructed by the mind in the course of 
the acquisition of knowledge" 
(Chomsky, 1971, p. 33) 
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This does not clarify the relationship between these 
constructed rulds and the actual behaviour of the language user. 
In other words, what is the relationship between the grammar and 
the user ? Is the grammar a black box or theoretical construct 
with simple predictive powers or is the grammar a model of a 
structure of the mind which controls the production of language ? 
One aspect of this problem which is of interest here is that 
some components of the grammar are sometimes not adhered to. That 
is, some rules of grammar are sometimes broken and some of these 
breaches are not accidental and do not lead to meaningless 
utterances. 
In Chomsky's words;- 
"They [the rules of grammar] can be violated, and in 
fact departure from the rules can often be an effective 
literary device" 	 (ibid, p. 33) 
Further, 
"deviation from strict grammatical rule is .... 
a feature of normal usage as well ...." 	(ibid, p. 33-32) 
Despite this, Chomsky apparently sees it as no more than an 
oddity, or at best irrelevant to his purpose. It is my contention 
that it is relevant to an understanding of language and that any 
model of language will have to give an account of this rule-breaking 
phenomenon. 	It is not just that some of the rules are "wrong" in 
that they are sometimes broken, but rather that they are mostly 
"right" and yet can be utilised to express meaning by being broken. 
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In practice, breaking the rules of language is common 
indeed. As an example, I do not think we need go beyond the 
one provided by Chomsky 
"To take a particularly simple example, Rebecca West, in 
criticism of the view that art reflects nature, wrote that 
'A copy of the universe is not what is required of art; one 
of the damned thing is ample.' The statement violates the 
rule of grammar that requires a plural noun in such phrases 
as 'one of the books is here or one of the damned things 
is enough.' But the statement is nevertheless exactly to 
the point. We can often exploit the expressive resources 
of language most fully by departing from its principles." 
(Chomsky, 1971, p. 32). 
However, other examples are provided in the course of the 
discussion. 
Although much has been made so far of Mooi's 
theory of metaphor, it is being utilised as the best available 
theory rather than supported as final doctrine. It can certainly 
be improved upon and with recent research in semantics and formal 
logic, this would be a worthwhile task. It is not a task that this 
present inquiry can fulfill. 
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I note here that this notion of metaphor as 
paradox is almost impossible to describe without resorting 
to metaphorical expressions. 	Black (1979) uses the 
analogy of "epi-chess",in which the players agree to allow 
variations on the rules (e.g. "any piece can move like 
any other piece"), providing both players agree. 	Black 
notes that although it is a primitive model of conversation, 
it suffers from assuming a "super-rule" which governs when 
and how the rules may be broken. 	Metaphor is far more 
lawless than that! 
It is clear that this notion of how metaphor works 
and how it is creative requires further exploration. 
That is the task of the next section. 
3. The Interactionist Metaphpr. 
The most precise research into metaphor by 
psychological standards is represented by Ortony (1979b) 
and Tourangeau and Sternberg (1978). 	In -a considerable 
way, both studies derive from the pioneering work by 
Tversky (1977) on the notion of similarity. 	Both studies 
develop Tversky's theoretical work and relate it to the 
study of metaphor. 	For present purposes, the contribution 
of the two studies will be considered jointly. 	Ortony 
expressly makes the point that the two approaches are compatible. 
Tourangeau and Sternberg (1978) are summarised 
by Ortony (1979, b) as follows: 
"Their research assumes a representation in which 
the topic and the vehicle of the metaphor (the first 
and second terms respectively) are viewed as belonging 
to different subspaces within a more global superspace. 
When the two terms are juxtaposed in a metaphor, one 
can think of superimposing their corresponding 
local spaces, co-ordinating the dimensions. 	Then, 
the goodness of a metaphor can be characterised in 
terms of the within-subspace distance and the between- 
subspace distance. 	If the local subspace from which 
the two terms are drawn are remote but the superimposed 
within-subspace distance is small, then we have a 
good metaphor " (p.178) 
Ortony's terminology is slightly different: 
"Metaphor is a non-literal comparison between objects 
or between relations between objects " (p.177). 
• "the ground of metaphor will be shared attributes 
of the underlying non-literal similarity statement 
and, in particular, those attributes that are of high 
Salience for the topic... 	The topic and vehicle 
interact in the sense that the topic term imposes 
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constraints on the attributes of the vehicle term 
that can be applied and that are of high salience 
for the former but of low salience for the latter " 
(p.177). 
"Salience can be operationally defined in terms of 
subjects' estimates of the prominence of a particular 
attribute with respect to a concept to which it does 
or could apply" (p.162). 
What is Lawediately striking about this kind of 
characterisation is that it is capable of dealing with the 
issue of what makes a good metaphor. 	For example, 
Tourangeau and Sternberg use as an instance of metaphor 
one of Donne's conceits from "Valediction: Forbidding 
Mourning:" 
"We propose that metaphors are more apt as they 
compare objects drawn from more diverse domains and 
as the fit between tenor and vehicle gets: better. 
Ideally, on this hypothesis, the tenor and vehicle 
should occupy exactly analogous positions within 
their domains (so that within - domains distance 
is maximal). 	Donne's conceits, with their elaborated 
points of comparison between diverse objects, are 
examples " (p.12). 
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The conceit is such a difficult problem for 
theorists that most have preferred to ignore it:. 	It 
appears to work at the limits of what it is possible to 
do in language without becoming meaningless. 	Consequently, 
it is a vexatious problem for monist theories of metaphor. 
Those who view metaphor as aberration can hardly cope with 
the success of such an extreme "aberration". 
The interactionist theorist, on the other hand, 
can cite the conceit as no different from any other metaphor 
except, perhaps, for its audacity in selecting subjects 
so disparate in other attributes. 	Tourangeau and Sternberg 
detail what Mooij (1976) called the D-dimensiom, and point 
out that the poet's success lies in matching the location 
of attributes within the two respective domains. 
Although these two studies provide a description 
of metaphor which in detail and precision is more advanced 
than other work, it does not affect in any significant 
way the relationship between metaphor and the motion of 
creativity in language. 	These studies confirm the 
interactionist view, and move closer towards a definitive 
statement of how metaphor works. 	However, they add little 
to how metaphor is related to language in general. 
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Ortony has put forward the concept of non-literal 
similarity, which is a powerful tool for illuminating 
metaphor, simile and analogy. 	The implications for a 
theory of language are less clear, except that it broadens 
the scope of what is legitimate data for the study of 
language. 
Metaphor is a meaning-related component of 
language and part of the opaque field of semantics. 	The 
interactionist theorists have added one more difficult 
phenomenon to the field. 
4. Creative Metaphors. 
Black (1979) poses the problem of creative 
metaphors in the following way: 
"A successful metaphor is realized in discourse, 
is embodied in the given 'text' and need not be 
treated as a riddle. 	So the writer or speaker 
is employing conventional means to produce a non-
standard effect, while using only the standard 
syntactic and semantic resources of his speech 
community. 	Yet the meaning of an interesting 
metaphor is typically new or 'creative', not 
inferable from the standard lexicon. 	A major task 
for theorists of metaphor, then, is to explain how 
such an outcome—striking for all its familiarity — 
is brought about " (p.23) 
He concludes: 
"But what is a 'creative', rule-violating metaphor 
producer really trying to do. 	And what is a 
competent hearer expected to do in response to 
such a move?" (p.24). 
From these coninients, as well as others referred 
to in previous sections, it is clear that in a general 
description of metaphor, it is attractive to use the 
word 'creative' to describe at least one aspect of metaphor. 
But, equally, there is a reluctance to specify this 
description further. 	It is a fact that many commentators 
refer to the creative power of metaphor in their opening 
comments only to abandon the description thereafter. 
Witness the use of inverted commas in Black (and others) 
when using the word, as if rather unwilling to use it at all.' 
Any discussion of metaphor is usually handicapped by 
lack of agreement as to what is a suitable metaphor for 
discussion. 	Black suggests that his examples are middle-of- 
the-range; neither too platitudinous nor too intricately 
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complex. 	However, others make the same claims of their 
examples. 	It is, therefore, reasonable not to make too much 
of individual examples, but to attend to the critical 
comments instead. 
Black selects three metaphors to precede his 
discussion and uses them to make his first point: that 
metaphors are always subject to multiple interpretations 
and there is nothing that can be done about that: 
... a metaphorical statement involves a rule 
violation: there can be no rules for 'creatively' 
violating rules. 	And that is why there can be no 
dictionary (though there might be a thesaurus) of 
metaphors " (p.25). 
and 
"There is an inescapable indeterminacy in the 
notion of a given metaphorical-statement so long 
as we count its import as part of its essence " 
(p.25). 
This argument seems to rely on the existence of 
metaphors complex enough to allow multiple interpretations. 
But is this very different from the multiple interpretations 
speakers of •English have •for literal language? The meaning 
110 
of a metaphor may be an individual matter (indeed, if 
meaning is "constructed" rather than "unpacked", then it 
must be), but the same holds for every other meaning in 
language. 	The interesting fact is that there is agreement 
on meaning, and this is true for metaphor as well. 	It is . 
granted that there is indeterminacy, yet this is not randomness 
and in the broad agreement lies the evidence for the 
ubiquity of metaphor, 
Precisely what Black means by his comments on 
rule violation is difficult to say, 	It seems that he is 
suggesting that there is no standard response to metaphor 
because that would result from the use of common rules for 
deriving the meaning of metaphor; since metaphor violates 
rules, there can be no standard response, 	In its strict 
sense this is true, but it is not one standard response 
that is presumed, but rather broad agreement. 	Again, is 
there a "standard response" for any entry in the lexicon? 
In any case, rule violations can be incorporated into a rule-
governed activity, 	In some games, there is provision for the 
rules of the game to be rewritten as the game is played. 
Of course, this then becomes a "super,rule"; but perhaps 
this is so in language. 	For instance, Grice ( s (1975) 
rules of conversation may be examples of super-rules, 
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To develop this point a little further, a 
metaphor is usually detected because the speaker makes 
an utterance which is somehow impossible (unlikely, 
implausible, etc.) 	The listener, remembering his 
Gricean super-rule - "the co-operative principle" - 
has a go at making sense of the rule-violation, and apparently 
manages to construct something like the meaning which the 
speaker was attempting to express. 
The point is that the rules of language may be 
ordered so that the rules of pragmatics can override l or 
be used to overcome, the rules of semantics and syntax. 
If this is so (or something like it), then metaphor becomes 
a pragmatic device in which context of conversation and 
situation overrides internal inconsistencies. 	It is fairly 
apparent from psycholinguistic evidence that metaphor is 
generally dependent on context (Ortony et al, 1978a, 
Verbrugge and McCarrell, 1977). 	In addition, it is apparent 
that if the listener thinks the speaker is insane, or 
incomprehensible for some other reason, then even if the 
insane person makes a metaphor, it will fail because the 
speaker will not 	bother 	to co-operate and decode it. 
One only has to imagine the sane poet, classified as insane 
by his audience (the nursing staff?), producing wonderfully 
rich and potentially rewarding metaphors which everyone 
around him ignores, in order to appreciate the value of Grice's 
co-operative principle (as well as the precarious position 
of poets). 
We can now return to Black's argument with less 
qualms about the strangeness of metaphors. 	In fact, 
Black devotes the last section of his paper to the question 
of the creativeness of metaphors. 	Unfortunately, the 
creativity concerned pertains to the creation of constructs 
which describe the real world. 	Black considers metaphors 
in the mould of models, maps, charts and diagrams; all are 
ways of showing how things are 	 to the extent that it may 
not have been expressed before, the device 	is creative. 
This conception is clearly not related to my concern which 
is to see how metaphor functions as a language-mechanism 
that is able to move beyond the constraints of the rules of 
language. 
Paivio (1979) appears more directly concerned with 
metaphor as an example of linguistic creativity: 
"metaphor highlights the phenomenon of semantic 
creativity, the capacity of language users to create 
and understand novel linguistic combinations that 
may be literal nonsense" (p.150). 
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and: 
"semantic productivity must be regarded as a salient 
design feature of metaphorical language, just as 
syntactic productivity is of language in general, 
despite the repetitiousness of specific grammatical 
construction in every day speech " (p.150). 
Pavio briefly reviews the psychological evidence 
for the existence of semantic creativity, centring largely 
on the finding that speakers are capable of producing 
semantic equivalents or paraphrases of many given 
expressions such as proverbs. 	In general terms, polysemy 
presents a problem for most theories of language in that 
it demands a degree of semantic productiveness of which they 
are not yet capable 	(Anderson and Ortony, 1975). 
The earlier study by Gleitman and Gleitman (1970) on 
paraphrase points up many of the same problems. 	It is 
Pavio's aim to attempt to integrate recent work on memory 
and cognition with the theory of metaphor in order to 
produce a conception of language sufficiently powerful to 
embrace semantic creativity. 
However, as his argument is developed, it becomes 
clear that Pavio is concerned with the conceptual activity 
which precedes its expression in the form of metaphor: 
"The comprehension of metaphor is basically a cognitive 
problem which centres around the following question: 
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How does a novel conceptual entity, arise from 
apparently disparate parts? .„ for the creator of the 
metaphor must first grasp the significance of a 
metaphorical relation before it is altered" (p.152). 
This is what was above referred to as conceptual 
creativity. 	It has an interesting link with metaphor 
which is one of its linguistic forms, but is not identical 
to it. 	It is quite conceivable that the 'novel conceptual 
entity' is expressed in a non-language form, e.g. diagramatically, 
or even in language, but non-metaphorically (using other 
figurative language). 
In fact, Pavio is examining language comprehension, 
specifically in the light of metaphorical language. 	He is 
less concerned with the facts of language which allow 
metaphor to be comprehended, 	It is unfortunate that, as 
in other studies, the two are not clearly distinguished. 
In a related study, Fraser (1979), continuing 
Pavio's orientation, examines the comprehension of novel 
metaphors. 	He concludes; 
... there is little consistency across speakers, 
... supporting the position that the interpretation 
of metaphor is based within a theory of language use, 
not a theory of grammar" (p,184),, 
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Probably the major difficulty with Fraser's study 
is that the metaphors presented to the subjects were 
arbitrarily created and not related to any context. 
Verbrugge and McCarrell (1977) and Ortony et al (1978a) 
emphasise the relevance of context, especially of metaphorical 
statements which do also have a complete literal meaning. 
The arbitrariness of the metaphors would lead to inconsistency, 
since all contextual clues were removed; subjects were 
clearly providing idiosyncratic responses within certain 
weak restraints pertaining to the standard meanings of the 
words used. 
Clearly, then, the psychological studies relate 
too closely to the comprehension and production activities 
which underlie metaphor and other creative conceptual 
activity. 	It says little about how all this relates to 
the language system within which it operates. 	The difficulty, 
of course, is that with metaphor we are not only operating 
at the limits of the grammatical system, but also approaching 
the domain of conceptual activity or cognition. 	It has 
been assumed that the public language shated between humans 
is.different from the conceptual medium employed in private 
thought. 	That is, there is a language for speaking and 	a 
language for thinking (see Fodor, 1975), 
This distinction is based on the fact that a 
novel concept may be expressed metaphorically, or it may be 
expressed in an altogether different medium such as 
a drawing. 	Also, metaphor may be employed to express 
an "old" concept in a novel way, where the form selected 
re-invigorates the concept. 
The question is, what happens to the language 
system when a metaphor is used? 	The short answer is 
that it depends on the view of language system employed; 
because if the language system is considered as a rule-
governed activity which only incorporates rules that 
operate at the level of phonology and syntax, then metaphor 
is obviously a rule-breaking activity and difficult to 
incorporate into any model of the language system. 	This 
is because metaphor always involves or implies semantic 
anomaly. 	Even if the language system contains some 
semantic rules, which operate at the level of the individual 
sign (the word), then metaphor is still a rule-breaking, 
semantically anamolous phenomenon. 
However, if the language system incorporates a 
broad semantics in which the function of language-- to mean—
is primary, then metaphor can be seen as a mode of meaning 
which utilises the lower levels of the system (syntax, word-
semantics, sentence-semantics) to make meaning in 
122 
123 
its overall sense. 	It is a level of meaning which utilises 
word-semantics by juxtaposing two contradictory units of 
word-semantics to produce a higher level meaning. 	This 
conception implies that the higher level rules of pragmatics 
(e.g. Grice's co-operative principle) can overrule lower 
level rules which suggest anomaly. 
Wheatley (1970) convincingly argues for a super-
rule which he calls "the Overriding Rule": 
"If some rule (which can be broken) is obviously broken, 
look for the explanation and act sensibly in the 
light of it ". 
He claims that unless such a rule exists, there is no 
conceivable way in which an expression such as "bachelor 
girl", when uttered for the first time, could be understood. 
The point is equally applicable to metaphor. 
Any instance of metaphor is marked by the breaking of some rule. 
However, the existence of the Overriding Rule allows a meaning 
to be constructed. 
This process implies a pecking order for rules. 
At least, it suggests that pragmatic rules can override 
syntactic or semantic rules. 	Further support for an 
order of application comes from the fact that syntactic- 
semantic rules can override, or at least dominate, 
phonological rules. 	This is clear from the positioning 
of stress patterns, which are directly dominated by 
semantic considerations. 
The process of deriving a meaning from an 
utterance therefore involves the application of various 
rules of various levels. 
To take Pascal's metaphor "Man is a thinking reed", 
the juxtaposition of 'thinking' and 'reed' involves a 
semantic clash at the level of the word. 	The whole 
meaning is produced by taking the meanings (including the 
connotations and implications) of the two words and letting 
them interact or interpenetrate each other until a unified 
concept appears (that is, the conception of man as a 
delicate, fragile, growth, yet strong IA 
his mental powers). 	This production process cannot be 
verified against a production manual, unlike word-semantics 
(dictionary), but it is within a range of variability that 
ensures comprehensibility l whilst not avoiding disagreement 
on .precise interpretation. 
The rules of language, whilst defining with some 
precision the literal domain of language, also afford the 
opportunity for breaking these rules. 	Without the rules 
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of word-semantics, there would be no metaphor. Metaphor 
exists because the rules are a social agreement, unlike 
the laws of nature, and, therefore, can be broken 
(Gantz, 1970). 	Like the rules of a game, or moral rules, 
their very existence implies the possibility of their negation. 
Only the ultimate rule (the Overriding Rule) cannot 
be broken because it defines the parameters of the language 
game. 	If it is ignored, then one is playing a different 
game. 
Therefore, metaphor operates on the boundaries of 
what it is possible to do in language and with language. 
Metaphor itself has boundaries which can be crossed to 
produce metaphors which are not comprehensible (e.g. Black's 
(1979) "the chair is a syllogism") but these boundaries 
seem to relate to what the listener can cope with. 
A listener may make an attempt to interpret a 
metaphor, and still be unsuccessful in coming up with anything 
sensible or meaningful. 	Experimental evidence suggests that 
when asked 	a person will produce some kind of 
interpretation; this often occurs when the test material 
is generated by combining randomly selected words. 
However, interpretability is also related to the experience 
of the listener. 	Tourangeau and Sternberg (1978) cite 
evidence for differences in the capacity of subjects to 
respond which was linked to their background (critics v. 
novices). 
This point is important, since it emphasizes that we 
are not dealing with a phenomenon identical for each 
language user. 	Metaphoricity relates to the idiolect of 
the language-user, both in production and comprehension. 
There are individual differences, and the interactionist 
theory copes with these through the subjective notion of 
"salience". 	One person's salience is another person's 
obscurity. 
Whenever a metaphor is created, it contributes to 
the language system in two ways. 	Firstly, it reinforces 
the way in which the metaphor was constructed and re-emphasizes 
how the rules of the system may be used to mean. 	Secondly, 
the actual usage may be preserved and become a part of the 
vocabulary, eventually losing its vividness and operating 
only as a distinct unit with a specifiable meaning 
comparable to the word-semantics level of meaning. 
This kind of institutionalisation or absorption into a 
lower level of the system can happen to a phrase or a 
complete sentence, thereby producing an idiom. 
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As Ortony (1975) puts it, metaphor is necessary. 
It is necessary because there may not be any other way 
to express in words what is being expressed. 	It is a 
compact, catachretic, device and what it lacks in precision 
(due to multiple interpretation) it makes up for in 
accessibility. Generally, everyone can follow some metaphors; 
they can be made complex, but usually only in specialised 
contexts such as poetry. 	Also, it is capable of operating 
in the affective domain of language, where considerations 
of strength and beauty are important, precisely because 
it is not confined to word-semantics. 
The model of metaphor described by Mooij (1976) is 
useful in drawing attention to the multiple effects of 
metaphor. 	What Mooij describes as the C-dimension relates 
to the power of the metaphor to re-organise conceptual 
structures in the brain; whatever the listener/reader 
thought of the primary subject before comprehending the 
metaphor, he now thinks of it differently. 	On this dimension, 
the success or strength of the metaphor is judged by the 
extent of this conceptual re-organisation: 	All this suggests 
that the C-dimension belongs not to the linguistic aspect of 
metaphor, but to its cognitive aspect. 	The C-dimension can 
also be ascribed to other forms of expression (models, 
diagrams, paintings, etc.) which can cause such a conceptual 
re-organisation. 
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The D-dimension is considered by Mooij to be less 
important or less essential. 	Yet, without it, the model 
would be incomplete p since no distinction could be made 
between metaphors in which the primary and secondary subjects 
are already conceptually close to each other, and those in 
which they are entirely disparate. 	There is an element of 
creativity in selecting primary and secondary subjects which 
relates to the artistry of the producer. 	It is the 
D-dimension which is manipulated by the audacious poet; to 
test its limits is to test the limits of the listener's 
ability to comprehend the metaphor. To take an example: 
(1) the Rhine is a sewer; 
(2) the Rhine is the aorta of Europe; 
(3) the Rhine is the mother of Holland. 
In (1) there is such closeness between the primary subject 
(the Rhine) and the secondary subject (a sewer) that it risks 
being a literal statement of fact rather than a metaphor. 
In (2) the distance between the primary subject (the Rhine) 
and the secondary subject (the aorta of Europe) is sufficient 
to see the purpose of the metaphor, but still the relation 
is bbvious. 	In (3) there is a strong chance that multiple 
interpretations will occur, e.g: 
(4) Holland was created by the silting of 
the Rhine delta; 
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(5) without its position on the Rhine, Holland 
would not have the economic status it 
has now. 
This is caused directly by the distance between the two 
subjects,which forces a greater amount of effort to be 
expended by the listener to interpret the -metaphor. 
Nevertheless, the D-dimension represents et task related 
to thinking rather than to using language. 	It is 
unmistakably carried out using language,but it represents 
the link or interface between language and thought. 
It is the R-dimension which is the hallmark of 
metaphor as a linguistic phenomenon. 	It is also the most 
difficult to capture and describe in words which are not 
metaphorical themselves. 	It is on this Level that complex 
metaphor works, and it is here that descriptions of 
interaction and interpenetration jump to mind. 	It is at 
this level that metaphor operates as a mechanism for 
semantic creativity. 
The R-dimension distinguishes between monistic and 
dualistic metaphors; between metaphors such as: 
(6) John is a chicken; 
and 
(7) John is a praying mantis. 
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(It is assumed that context will dismiss the literal meaning 
of "a chicken called John".) 	Theoretically, it distinguishes 
between the connotation theories of Beardsley and the 
interactionist theories of Black. 	(The C-dimension 
distinguishes between Black's theory and the comparison 
theories, e.g. Miller, 1979). 
The R-dimension focuses attention on the secondary 
subject and characterises the strength of the reference 
to the literal meaning of the secondary subject. 	In the 
case of (6) there is little reference to the literal 
meaning of "chicken"; the expression is so familiar as a 
description of cowardice that there is no real reference 
to the literal meaning. 	In the case of (7), it is necessary 
to work on the metaphor in order to derive its full meaning. 
In isolation, this is difficult, but context would normally 
provide clues that would ensure disambiguation: placed 
in the context of a description of John's attitude to women 
and his sexual approaches to them, the metaphor may take on 
more meaning. 
Following Mooij, it is suggested that upon encountering 
a high R metaphor the listener, with the assistance of 
contextual clues, employs a pragmatic rule (the co-operative 
principle) to decode the metaphor's anomalous meaning at 
sentence level to construct a proper meaning at discourse 
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level. 	In the case of (7) some appropriate element of the 
meaning of the word(s) "praying mantis" is selected and 
projected on the meaning of the word "John". 
Now this description is clearly imprecise and 
metaphorical. 	"Appropriate element" covers a host of 
questions which are not answered. 	Ortony (1976) and 
Tourangeau and Sternberg (1978) have moved some way towards 
a description which is more precise. 	They build a subjective 
element into the description (salience) which accounts for 
individual differences. 	At the same time, they quantify, 
in geometrical terms, the relations between the primary 
and secondary subjects. 
More importantly, the description arouses questions 
as to the nature of "projection", a metaphorical term. 
Black (1962, 1979) discusses this in detail, but the 
present concern is the implications for semantic creativity. 
Somehow, this projection produces a new meaning (although 
this idea, the essence of interactionism, is denied by the 
comparison theorists) which adds to the stock of meanings 
possible in the language. 	It is a language-based meaning, 
because it would not arise without language; it is a 
direct consequence of manipulating linguistic signals to 
manufacture a new linguistic signal. 
In fact, the new meaning embodied in the new 
linguistic signal (the metaphor) may become a stock part 
of the repertoire available to members of a speech community. 
Somewhere between its creation and its entombment as a 
"dead metaphor", there occurs a process of degradation 
whereby the metaphor descends down the scale of the 
R-dimension. 	Presumably, it takes less work to employ 
a dead metaphor than to create a new one, and thus 
entropy will ensure the process of degradation. 
At the same time, human experience moves on and the 
mechanism of metaphor creation responds to the needs of 
the situation. 	Metaphor both uses the linguistic 
resources to create and express the new meaning. And that 
is the paradox of metaphor: it is at one and the same time 
the producing mechanism and the product. 
Semantic creativity, in the case of metaphor, makes 
possible the extension of meaning in language. 	It is 
necessary because meanings are disappearing as expressions 
are under-utilised and forgotten— imagine the metaphors 
no longer available to us in English. 	Without the regenerative 
process of metaphor, our language would degenerate to a 
stock of basic meanings, sufficient only to cover the literal 
requirements of the day. 
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If a computer were to be programmed with the literal, 
dictionary meanings of English and without the pragmatic rule 
of co-operation between language users, then that might be 
English without metaphor. 	Now, if the computer could somehow 
experience (but not through a linguistic input) a new 
meaning which it wished to express, then it would simply 
not be able to do it. 	As long as human speakers experience 
new meanings which require expression, metaphor is essential, 
because ultimately there is no more convenient way of 
expressing a new meaning. (There are other, non-linguistic 
ways but it is not always convenient to make a drawing 
or execute a dance). 
5. 	Conclusion. 
Metaphor, as a mechanism of language, works by 
breaking the rules of language. 	The resulting anomaly 
is a signal for the listener to apply the Overriding 
Rule in order to determine a meaning. 	Therefore, metaphor 
is a pragmatic mechanism. 
The anomaly which triggers the application of the 
Overriding Rule may be at word-level or at sentence-level, e.g.: 
(1) "bachelor girl". lexical anomaly; 
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(2) "The old warhorse is starting to slow down" 
(referring to the Prime Minister) --semantic 
anomaly. 
It is conceivable that a complete text may be metaphorical, 
as in a parable ; in which case the anomaly is at discourse 
level. 	In all cases, the Overriding Rule governs the 
determination of meaning. 
The Overriding Rule is the only rule of language 
which cannot be broken. 	If it is ignored, then language 
is no longer being used. 
Metaphor is the mechanism used to express meaning 
which cannot be accommodated within the standard rules for 
expressing meaning. 	The intended meaning is usually novel 
in that it has not been expressed before. 	The particular 
expression which results may become an institutionalised 
part of language - an idiom. 
Metaphors differ in their success because the 
mechanism is discriminant. 	The Overriding Rule does not 
guarantee that a meaning will be determined. 	That relies 
on the goodness of the metaphor, which is dependent on the 
relationship between the two domains of the two subjects and 
the salience of the attributes which compose the grounds 
for the non-literal comparison. 
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Metaphor resides on the border between competence 
and performance. 	It is entirely dependent on (breaking) 
the rules of the grammar 	At the same time, it is 
dependent on the Overriding Rule (a pragmatic rule) which 
is an aspect of usage. 	Therefore, it can easily be 
described as a peripheral grammatical mechanism. 
Much more needs to be known about the relationship 
between metaphor and idioms, about the rules for 
metaphorizing and about changing grammars, before models 
of language which incorporate metaphor can be built. 
What is known, however, suggests that it can no longer 
be ignored by the model builders. 
So far l in this study, metaphor is the closest 
phenomenon yet to represent creativity in language. 
We have excluded syntactic creativity as a misnomer. 
We have excluded pragmatic creativity because, following 
Chomsky (1980), it can be seen to relate to conceptual 
structures in the brain, rather than to language. 
Semantic creativity seems the most fruitful area of 
investigation, and as . a part of this, metaphor is a well-
studied device for semantic innovation. 	The purpose of 
the next chapter is to continue the exploration of less 
well-described examples of semantic creativity. 
6. CREATIVITY IN LANGUAGE. 
1. Introduction.  
The examination of metaphor has shown that 
there exists a capacity in language for going beyond the 
rules of syntax and semantics and yet producing 
comprehensible utterances. 
Much of recent work in language has centred 
on the notion that language is a system and that it is 
the task of linguistics to explicate the rules and 
elements of this system. 	However, it is an assumption 
that there is only one system that can describe the whole 
of language. 
The part of language which has received the 
most attention is the part which Chomsky has called "the 
grammar of language". 	It has focussed on the structural 
rules of language and has given most attention to syntax. 
It has also involved the system of sound symbolisation, that 
is, phonology; and of late, has turned to the system of 
meaning, especially as it relates to syntax. 	Chomsky has 
attempted to confine all this within the "grammar" and 
juxtaposed it with "usage". 
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The theoretical notions of "competence" and 
"performance" are at the heart of the distinction between 
"grammar"and"usage". In itself, the distinction is 
practical enough, for it establishes a discrete area of 
investigation within the generally amorphous phenomenon of 
language. 	Further, the distinction is valid in that there 
is ample empirical evidence to show that there is a 
difference between what a speaker does and what he is 
capable of doing. 
It is, however, only one distinction among many 
that may be made, and is not necessarily more important than, 
say, the distinction between the physical signs (sounds) 
and the mental significance (meaning), or even between what 
is said (semantics) and what is done (pragmatics). 
The point is that it may be fruitful to consider 
language as a system of systems, in which all the various 
contributing factors are governed by rules which are not 
identical for all systems and may even compete with each 
other. 
After all, the phonology of language makes the 
most out of the least elements, whereas the lexicon of 
language is at best a fuzzy set in a constant state of flux. 
It hardly seems likely that such variety can be contained 
within the, one single system, 
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In such a system of systems it becomes possible 
for the language user to make alterations to one or the 
other system or part of a system to produce a certain 
effect. 	The relationship among the systems becomes a 
factor in the language. 	Through addition, deletion and 
alteration of parts of the system, a desired effect may be 
obtained. 
It is in this sense that language is creative. 
Creativity is the manipulation of the various organised 
parts of language to produce an effect. 	It is the 
reconstruction of the parameters of language. 
This approach to language has been adopted by 
De Beaugrande l with the specific aim of exploring the 
creativity of language. 
2. The Approach of De Beaugtande. 
In his paper "Linguistics and Creativity", 
De Beaugrande (1978) attempts to outline a general theory 
of creativity in language. 
He begins his analysis by juxtaposing two 
approaches which attempt to accommodate the creative aspect 
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of language. 	Firstly, there is the tradition, derived from 
the linguistic study of literature,which treats creativity 
as a departure from the norm. 	The dominant concept is 
"deviation" and the implication is that creativity is outside 
the language system, which is composed of specifiable 
elements and rules. 	Comprehension of the "creative" 
utterances is possible through a process of analogy and 
this may lead to new elements and rules. 	De Beaugrande 
calls this the externalist viewpoint. 
Secondly, there is the internalist viewpoint, 
which is described as arising from the Chomskyan approach 
to language. 	That is, creativity is inherent in the 
system of elements and rules because the rules are such 
that an infinity of sentences can be produced. 
The two views are contrasted in that: 
"The externalist view gives no standards to distinguish 
non-grammatical poetry from nonsense; by the same 
token, the internalist viewpoint provides no means 
to distinguish between the external linguists' banality 
of 'The cat sat on the mat' and a well-formed poetic 
utterance such as Tennyson's 'The splendour falls on 
castle walls' " (De Beaugrande, 1978, p.3). 
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Clearly, De Beaugrande is referring to what have 
been called, in the present work, "rule-governed creativity" 
and "rule-breaking creativity". 
De Beaugrande outlines some of the difficulties 
in using these two points of view in textual analysis, and 
then turns to a formulation which tries to avoid these 
difficulties. 	This formulation is given the description 
of "motivated modification of systems". (This approach 
is explored in detail in De Beaugrande and Dressler Introduction 
to Text Linguistics (1979)). 
Briefly, language is viewed not as one system of 
elements and rules, but as an Intersystem . .;, which is: 
"an integrated set of participating systems. 	Each 
system is definable by three factors: 
(1) the elements it contains; 
(2) the organization principles applicable to those 
elements; and 
(3) the correlation of the system to others within 
the system " (1978, p.4). 
It is noted that by this definition any text 
is itself a system but since a text is the actual and 
only occurring manifestation of language, it is given 
the tag transsystem. 	"Texts imply the potential for 
transcending language systems, that is: modifying either 
the repertory of elements, the organizational principles, 
or the correlation of systems " (p.4). 
It is the modification of part of a system which 
is relevant to the theory of language creativity. 	Such 
modification is carried out for a communicative purpose; 
that is, it is motivated by "the demands of a particular 
communicative situation" (p.4). 	Random modification would 
produce a "non,text" (or nonsense), 
The modification of a language system has certain 
restrictions placed on it by the particular communicative 
situation. 	The tolerance level of different individuals, 
social groups, social situations, etc., varies and a 
successful modification requires that such tolerance levels 
be respected. 
De Beaugrande exphasizes that the communicative 
process he outlines involves both speaker and listener 
(writer/reader) in an active way, because the original 
modification has to be reconstructed by the listener. 
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There is ample room for ambiguity in this process, and multiple 
interpretation is quite possible; 	in the case of literary 
texts, it may even be a predominant characteristic. 
The nature of the modification process is briefly 
discussed by De Beaugrande. 	He postulates that the 
modification mechanism is best described as a bundle of 
strategies, as opposed to rules which are standardised. 
He does this in order to preserve the element of individual 
freedom inherent in the modification mechanism. These 
strategies collectively constitute "creative competence". 
The individual language systems vary greatly. 
The phoneme system contains elements few in number, 
perhaps consisting of a closed set., whereas the lexical 
system contains many, perhaps indefinitely many, and 
consisting of an open set. 	The organizational principles. 
which govern the combination of elements may be rigid 
(e.g. the exclusion of certain phoneme-clusters or syntactic 
sequences) or flexible (e.g. word..formation). 	Generally, 
modification of rigid organizational principles or of 
closed sets of elements is less tolerable than modification 
of flexible organizational principles i or of open sets 
of elements. 	This range of tolerance is vital in literary 
textual analysis. 
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The modification strategies are all based on 
recombination. 	Simple operations such as addition, 
deletion, and alteration account for the modifications 
made to the three integrated sets (elements, organizational 
principles, intersystem correlation) of each system. 
This allows for a vastly productive intersystem. 
De Beaugrande completes his outline by analysing 
some of Lewis Carrol's work in some depth, and he concludes 
with a definition of creativity: 
"Whatever modifications are performed upon prevailing 
systems, be they composed of phonemes, morphemes, 
narrative sequences, or real-world organization, 
language users gain new insights into both the 
standards of those systems and their potential for 
change. 	In short, creativity is the process whereby 
we become aware of the present and the possible 
conditions for the organization of cognition, and 
whereby we enable others to re-enact that awareness " 
(p.9). 
Obviously, De Beaugrande only presents the bare 
outline of a theory of language. However, it is possible 
to see the orientation he is advocating, as well as to 
generalise about the essential nature of this orientation. 
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Basically, De Beaugrande is enlarging the 
traditional concept of the grammar of language to include 
all that is relevant to the understanding of any utterance. 
In a sense language has become open-ended in that the 
grammar now includes not only the phonology, the syntax and• 
some lexico-semantics, but also everything else that 
pertains to meaning, including the structured perception 
of the real world. 
This is a radical step, and raises virtually every 
problem of interest to modern linguistics. 	Nevertheless, 
it is of value in that it contributes to the general 
development of a conception of language away from the 
syntactic conception which has dominated modern linguistics 
for most of this century. 	It retains the structural approach 
of the syntacticians ; but puts it at the disposal of the 
theoreticians concerned with language as the mechanism that 
enables meaning to be expressed. 
The essential structural aspect of language 
is that it consists of systems, each of which consists of 
elements, rules,and ways of relating that system to other 
systems. 	The task of the linguist is to delineate these 
systems and describe the elements, rules and correlational 
aspects. 
Because each system consists of elements and 
rules, it is possible to describe only these aspects and 
manufacture an internally consistent system. 	However, 
at some point this system relates to other systems, and 
unless this correlation is made explicit the system 
remains an isolated and sterile thing. 
For the reasons that Chomsky used to describe his 
syntactic system as "creative", all these systems are 
creative. 	They are composed of elements and rules, and 
therefore can be made to be infinitely productive. 	Other 
systems provide a context which can limit this productivity, 
such as the cognitive limitations on the production of 
syntactic strings, or real-world limitations on the 
production of phoneme strings (there' are acceptable but 
unused strings). 	These contextual restrictions belong 
to the correlational aspect of each system. 
Clearly, such a conception of language as an 
intersystem is compatible with the conclusions so far drawn 
in this study. 	Syntactic creativity, although the 
description is questioned, is clearly one way of describing 
the infinite productivity of a system that consists of 
elements and rules. 
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Metaphor can now be reinterpreted in a slightly 
different way. 	The overall meaning of a text is derived 
by following the semantic-syntactic rules that govern the 
process of interpretation; the details of this are 
unclear. 	What is clear is that meaning can also be derived 
by not following the rules; by breaking them in such a way 
as to demand an interpretation to be made despite the 
breach of rules. 
Table 1 demonstrates that meaning in metaphor 
is derived by one system overriding another system. 
Therefore, metaphor is produced by the relation 
between systems; by the system which takes precedence, 
overriding the rules (organizational principles) of 
another system. 	It is a language device which relies on 
intersystem relations. 
In the examples given in the table, it is clear 
that if the relations between the systems are ignored, 
then metaphor ceases to exist. 	The phrae meaning of 
"a bachelor girl" is more than the sum of the word 
meanings, since some of the word meanings are composed of 
contradictory lexical features (i.e. + male and - male). 
Essentially, metaphor is a strategy which says: 
"Ignore +/- clash at feature level, if at a higher 
level (the phrase) a significant construction can 
be derived." 
Similarly, with "The old warhorse is ready to 
be put down", where there is a clash between sentence 
meaning and context, the next highest level (textual 
meaning) determines that a significant construction can 
be derived. 	This becomes clearer if the sentence is 
placed in a passage or a longer text,which then provides 
the context. 	In the example used here, the situation 
of the utterance provides the context. 
The non-literalness of metaphor is, therefore, 
another way of stating that the significance is derived 
from a level different from the literal utterance which 
carries the anomaly. 
Since metaphor is traditionally considered within 
the framework of literary text, it is worth noting that 
generally the context of a literary metaphor is the whole 
surtounding text. 	Literature contextualises itself 
and is, or can be, independent of its situation of 
utterance. 	It is this which makes it different from any 
other text. 
147 
It is also evident that the intersystem relation 
which enables metaphor to exist is based on the notion 
of meaning. Metaphor does not seem to occur below the 
word level. 	It only relates to meaning-bearing units 
above the word: 	the phrase, the sentence, the text. 
Meaning units above the text are speculative but perhaps 
can be encompassed by the nOtion of 	'weltanschauung'. 
At this level, we have arrived at the limits of linguistics 
and are knocking at the door .of thought. 
Metaphor, then, is a non-literal,meaning-based, 
intersystem relation which derives from the general strategy: 
"Ignore the (literal) anomaly at one level, if a 
significant construction can be derived at a higher 
level." 
This strategy can be supported by examining a 
sample of metaphors. (The +/- notation is a rough notation 
of semantic anomalies at the word level; its use does not 
endorse any particular semantic theory). The following 
examples have been drawn from arbitrary sources. They are 
intended to confirm the general strategy of decoding 
metaphors by moving from one system to another. 
140Ra - . 
	
1. 	"But ye loveres, that bathen in gladnesse" 
(Chaucer; Troilus and Criseyde I) 
Literal Anomaly: "bathen" and "gladnesse" 
Level: word - meaning ("bathe" requires + liquid) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
• The lovers approach to gladness 
is to enjoy it as one would enjoy 
a bath, with overtones of total 
immersion, fresh cleanliness, 
purity, etc. 
Level: phrase-meaning 
2. 	'The sky rejoices in the morning's birth" 
(Wordsworth, Resolution and  
Independence) 
A. Literal Anomaly: "rejoices" and "sky" 
Level: , word - meaning("rejoices" requires 
+ animate) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
The sky, an inanimate object, gives 
• the appearance of exuberant happiness, 
linking the ambiguity of brightness 
Level: 	phrase - meaning 
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. Literal Anomaly: "birth" 
Level: word - meaning ("birth" requires 
animate) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate) 
The _morning arrives as if delivered 
by night, linking the shared meaning 
of 'beginnings' for dawn and birth. 
Level: phrase - meaning. 
3. 	"Susan Smith recently embarked on a three month 
mousseline marathon". 
*(The Pleasures of Cooking  
Vol. V,No. 6, p. 2) 
Literal Anomaly: "mousseline" and "marathon" 
Level: work - meaning ("marathon" requires: 
4- running ?) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate) 
- Smith researched, 'cooked and ate 
mousselines for such a long and 
tiring period that her effort was . 
like running a marathon running race. 
Level: phrase - meaning 
N.B. Note the weakness of this metaphor, which through 
common use requires little decoding ie. "marathon" 
may soon literally equal any long and tiring effort. 
The sentence also contains a metaphorical use of 
"embark". 
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4. 	"Washington restaurants forced men to don strings 
around their neck". 
(National Times, 29 July 1983 p. 8) 
Literal Anomaly: Dress requirements for men and "strings". 
Level: sentence - meaning (men wearing 
• strings around their neck) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
• Some restaurants continue to enforce 
dress requirements which in themselves 
are meaningless; in this case, attention 
• is drawn to the arbitrariness of one 
garment, the tie, by describing it as 
a string. 
Level: text - meaning 
N.B. Note that on the D-dimension, the primary and 
secondary subject are very close (in one sense, 
a tie is a string) and hence the sentence itself 
probably provides sufficient context to decode 
this meaning. 
5. 	• "Catch the eye". 
(Southern Tasmania Telephone  
• Directory, 1982, p. 26) 
Literal Anomaly: "catch" and "eye" 
• Level: phrase - meaning 	• 
Non-literal meaning (approximate) • 
In the context of an advertisement 
• advocating the use of bold print in 
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• telephone directory entries, this 
idiomatic expression means something 
like "Attract the attention of the 
• reader." 
Level: texts - meaning 
N.B. The phrase here is co-extensive with the sentence 
hence the level of sentence - meanings is omitted. 
6. 	"I will sketch what seems to me an appropriate 
framework." 
'(Reflections on Language, 
N. Chomsky, p. 3) 
Literal Anomaly: the sentence - meaning of drawing a 
plan of a particular physical structure. 
Level: sentence - meaning (Chomsky does not 
provide an architectural drawing of 
a framework) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate) 
In the context of an introductory 
• note to a general work of linguistics,. 
Chomsky is indicating that he will 
provide a conceptual structure derived 
from his theoretical work. 
Level: text - meaning 
N.B. The metaphor is strengthened, in a traditional 
way, by the metaphorical use of "framework". 
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7. tt Disco - the Vietnam of modern music". 
• (Graffiti, Hobart, 1983) 
Literal Anomaly: "the Vietnam" and "modern music" 
• Level: word - meaning (the connection between 
• "modern music" and "the Vietnam") 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
The diverse but powerful connotations 
of the Vietnam War are linked, as a 
criticism, to a particular genre of 
dance music. It draws upon Vietnam 
as an image for failure, madness, 
destruction, calculated folly, and 
mass manipulation, relating these 
outrageously to :  disco music. 
Level: text-meaning 
N.B. The slogan is a complete test although it is in 
this ,case co-extensive with the sentence. 
8. 	"Until one dips into legal history ..." 
(The Proof of Guilt, Glanville .  
Williams, p. 4) 
• Literal Anomaly: "dips" and "history" 
• Level: • word-meaning ("dips" requires + liquid) 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
History is likened to a liquid mass 
which can be carefully but superficially 
encountered. "Dipping into history" 
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• 	 is a common-place metaphor, 
strengthened in this case because the 
author is a well-known authority on 
legal history who could hardly be 
described as "dipping in history". 
Level.: sentence-meaning 
CA more complete appreciation of its significance 
requires a degree of knowledge about the author). 
9. 	"Never in his life had he seen a river before - this 
sleek, sinuous, full-bodied,animal, chasing and chuckling, 
gripping things with a gurgle and leaving them with a 
laugh, to fling itself on fresh playmates that shook 
themselves free, and werecaught and held up again." 
(The Wind in the Willows, 
Kenneth Grahame, p. 5) 
Literal Anomaly: "river" and its description 
Level: phrase-meaning 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
The river is described in terms of an 
animal in an extended but coherent 
metaphor. It is most appropriate since 
the "he" is, in fact, the mole. The 
description draws on the life qualities 
of an animal and projects these onto the 
river. 
Level: sentence-meaning 
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10. "The early bird catches the worm." 
(Proverb) 
Literal Anomaly: The proverb and the situation to 
which it is applied. 
Level: text-meaning 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
He who gets up early in the morning 
will make the most of those situations 
where being early brings an advantage. 
Level: context-meaning 
N.B. No particular claims are being made• here about the 
meaning level above the text level. For convenience, 
it is called "context". 
11. “... my  body itched with the desire to sleep." 
CLadY Oracle, Margaret Attwood, p. 140) 
Literal Anomaly: "itched with desire" and "body" 
Level: word-meaning 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
The person was in need of sleep. 
Level: sentence-meaning 
N.B. Attwood actually converts ,a metaphor (the idiomatic 
expression "itching with desire") which draws upon 
a physical effect to describe a mental phenomenon, 
into one which describes a physical phenomenon. As 
a metaphor, it is a double-take. 
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12. 	"callous" 
(Oxford English Dictionary) 
Literal Anomaly: "Physically hardened" and the context 
•of its application to human beings. 
Level: word-meaning 
Non-literal meaning (approximate): 
unfeeling. 
Level: word-meaning 
N.B. Obviously, a good deal could be said about the 
extension of meaning at the word-level through 
the process of metaphor. It is a little beyond 
the scope of the present work. 
Linguistics may describe the component systems of language, 
by specifying their rules and elements. But there exists 
a further potential for meaning by playing off one system 
against another. As in metaphor, this is done by creating 
an apparent. "mistake" which is overt, and which is intended 
to be overcome or resolved by resorting to a different 
level or system which is able to over-ride the first 
system. 
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TABLE 	1 - METAPHOR. 
A.1. "the professor is nearing 
retirement." 
Context: Conversation about 
an ageing professor. 
MI=Xi/Y; 
where MI= meaning 
Xi= sentence meaning 
Y = context. 
2. The old warhorse is ready 
to be put down". 
NJ=X2/Y ; 
where 112= meaning 
X2= sentence meaning 
Y = context.. 
In 2., there is an anomaly, in 
that -- 
X2 +literal 
Y -literal, 
When there is an anomaly, 
context overrides sentence 
meaning to produce meaning, 
B.1. "an unmarried girl" 
where MI= phrase meaning 
A = subject 
Bi= deccriptor. 
2. "a bachelor girl" 
li=A/B2 j 
where b.12= phrase meaning 
A = subject 
B2= descriptor, 
In 2., there is an anomaly, in 
that -- 
A -male 
B2 +male . 
When there is an anomaly, descriptor' 
overrides selectional restrictions 
to produce phrase meaning. 
At this point, it would be valuable if this general 
approach can be supported by data and conclusions from other 
research. 	To date, the most detailed work in linguistics 
has been done with those systems which are most discrete 
and concrete, that is, the phonemic system and the syntactic 
system. 
3. The Phonemic System. 
For an example of how the work of other theoreticians 
complements the work of De Beaugrande, a recent study by 
Charles Ferguson,"PhonolOgidal'DevelOpment" (1980),', has 
been selected. 
Ferguson's aim, in this paper is to "discuss 
phonological development as exemplifying cognitive processes 
which may operate outside phonology as well " (p.52). 
This contrasts with the more usual emphasis on the acquisition 
order of phonemes and segments, and its relationship to 
adult phonology. 	He is not concerned with the physiology 
of production and perception, but rather with cognitive 
strategies. 
Ferguson outlines some of the cognitive strategies 
used by children in their phonological development, and 
then turns to the creativity inherent in the phonological 
system; specifically the phonotactic constraints which 
permit the generation of many words which donot exist 
but which could exist; 	that is, as far as the phonological 
rules are concerned, the word is permissible. 	He also 
suggests that it is possible to break the phonological 
rules and produce a word which is not permissible. 
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He provides several examples: 
1. /via/ -- 'book' from 'songbook' 
2. /s/ 	instead of word-final /t d n p f/ 
3. /f/ 	instead of /tr dr kr pr/. 
From the discussion, it is apparent that the 
strategy employed by the child is to achieve some 
discrimination in expression within the particular range 
of phonemes available to him. 	For example, in the second 
case, when word-final stops were not available to her, the 
child resorted to the voiceless palatal fricative in order 
to indicate the shortness of syllables ending in consonants. 
This kind of inventiveness suggests that even at 
this early age, the language user is capable of adapting the 
rules of language to her needs. 	It also suggests that the 
overall purpose of using the rules is to be meaningful 
rather than to be rule-obedient; if necessary, a rule 
can be broken if it facilitates the communicative function. 
For the nature of a rule of language, see Gantz (1970), 
4. Relations Between Systems. 
This brief example from the phonological 
development of the child should suffice to indicate that 
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in at least some levels of language there is scope for 
creativity, and that in each case the motivation is 
communicative intent. 	Other systems of language such 
as morphologyl as well as more detailed aspects of 
particular systems such as stress patterns,need examination 
in order to determine whether the general pattern described 
by De Beaugrande is universal. 	For the moment, it is 
sufficient to note that it is general enough to encompass 
most aspects of language. 
The question arises whether the overriding of 
one system always occurs for semantic motivations. 
The examples provided by Ferguson suggest that 
it is indeed the desire to express oneself that leads to 
systemic breach. 	Breaching the phonological system 
is rare enough not to have a name, but it is still carried 
out in order to facilitate the discrimination of meaning. 
Breaching the meaning-based system(s) of language is 
metaphor. 	It seems that the desire to express oneself 
is more often resolved by adapting the meaning-based 
system(s) to one's needs. 	This may be so simply because 
it is the overriding function of language to mean. 
(Halliday, 1975). 	Phonology, syntax and morphology play - 
a. role auxiliary to this function and contribute to the 
meaning process indirectly. 	However, they can be focussed 
upon for their own sake, thereby producing an effect 
similar to an artist focusing upon the effects he uses 
in his art. 	Magritte is an outstanding example of such 
an approach and he is paralleled in language by e e cummings. 
The effect of concentrating on the form is 
interesting. It ensures that the viewer/listener is 
required to concentrate on what is normally taken for 
granted. 	One has to step out of the system to see the 
whole. 	The facile example of this effect is "concrete 
poetry" where the form is also the content. 	But more 
subtle effects can be achieved and, again, the visual 
analogy is Magritte (for example, "Common Sense" 1945, 
and "The Human Condition I" 1933). 	In language, artists like 
Thomas, Hopkins and Joyce consciously focus our interest 
on the words, as words, and then proceed to the specialised 
meaning. 	The phenomenon is by no means limited to the 
twentieth century, as the work of the medieval poet . 
William Dunbar, indicates. 	Even a simple sonnet is an 
example of a textual form having a significance in its own 
right, separately from its content, 
The paradox here is that one has to step out of the 
system to see what it means. 	This element of regression 
introduces a contradictory element into the process, 
To stay within the system is to insist that sorrow cannot 
be sweet, that man is not a wolf, that he is not a reed, 
thinking or otherwise. 	To jump out of the system is to 
see the significance of what is being expressed, but 
at the cost of a higher level of consciousness. 	To 
understand a metaphor is to manipulate the system as a 
system; it brings a consciousness of language that can 
only be described in a meta-language such as the language 
used by linguists. 	The listener is suddenly aware that 
there is such a thing as the signal itself, and that it 
mediates meaning. 
Now, this regression may be taken further, for 
it is conceivable - and in complex works of literature it 
often occurs - that metaphors are metaphorised so that 
one is embedded in the other. 	In its simplest sense, a 
whole text may be a metaphor, at the same time consisting 
of metaphors. 	A text may consist of a texts for example, 
a diary, which recounts the narrative, itself consisting 
of metaphors of one kind or. another. 	This introduces the 
potential for self-reference which complicates the whole 
design; for instance, if the author is.referred to in 
- his own text; let alone his being Ilimself one of his own . 
characters, or using characters who speak directly to the 
author. 
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In a more general sense, the awareness of 
language as language introduces an element of self-reference 
within the linguistic system. 	Max Black (1968) describes 
this in the following way: 
"Here we have a striking instance of one of the 
most remarkable features of language, its 'reflexive' 
capacity to become its own subject. 	This is absent 
from other forms of representation, or present only 
in a rudimentary and uninteresting form. There is 
no sense to the idea of 'music about music'; and 
maps of maps, or paintings of paintings, have little 
interest. 	By contrast, the power we have to talk 
about talking, by inventing auxiliary devices for the 
crystallization of linguistic and logical structure, 
is at the heart of the creative power of language. 
The interplay between the informal 'insight' expressed 
in unformalized language, and the formal or 'mechanical' 
properties, codified in a symbol system, deserves more 
attention than can here be provided " (p.102). 
These are all potentialities introduced by the 
concept of metaphor, or rather by the language capacity 
upon which metaphor rests. 	System-switching is,useful 
only as long as the system stays basically intact. 
There must be rules to be broken, and elements to juxtapose. 
There is a basic entropy or wastage which suggests that 
the new creations either disappear or become part of the 
standard system. 	This entropy balances the creativity f 
systemic breach. 
It is now possible to reinterpret the descriptions 
used by Chomsky which were detailed in Chapter 1. 
"Rule-governed" creativity or syntactic creativity is an 
example of within-system creativity, in this case within the 
syntactic system. 
It is creative only in the sense that it is 
unbounded because of the recursive properties of the 
syntactic system. 	The rules of the syntactic system are 
such that the elements can be strung together indefinitely. 
Similarly, given the phonotactic rules of the phonological system, 
it is possible, using the elements of the system, to produce 
strings which lack meaning just as the syntactic strings can 
be made to lack meaning through sheer complexity. 
Now, it is possible to attach meaning to such 
strings, either through sheer innovation ("I hereby dub 
prote to mean 'an ideologically incompetent person"!). 
or by structuring them in a particular way ("The House that 
Jack Built"). 	This is still only exploiting the within-system 
resources of the system. 	It is a formal aspect of the 
system l and does not deserve the description 'creativity'. 
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"Rule-breakinecreativity depends on the resources 
that are made available by the multiple system basis of 
language. 	Once there is a lexical system and a syntactic 
system, it is possible to let one system override the 
other. 	This is between-system creativity, and depends on 
using the relationships between systems. 
As with within-system creativity, the motivation 
for using these resources is the communicative intent of 
the user. 	The purpose is to express meaning. 	Unlike 
within-system creativity, the attachment of meaning is 
not arbitrary (that is, an idiosyncratic linguistic event), 
but structured, in the sense that the rules of the two 
systems are utilised in a special way. 	Once that special 
use is perceived, then it is a simple matter for any member 
of the linguistic community to duplicate the process. 
In short, between-system creativity is accessible to all. 
If the rules of the lexical system override the 
rules of the syntactic system, then there is metaphor 
at the phrase level or sentence level. 
In "the bachelor girl", the syntactic system is 
breached because the descriptor is required to agree with 
the noun. There - is instead . a clash at the level 
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+/- male. 	If there was no between-system creativity, then 
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the construction would be dismissed as faulty, similarly to 
the way in which "bachelor the girl" or "bachelor girl 
the" is dismissed. 	However, the lexical system can 
cope with the syntactic breach,.by allowing the metaphoric 
process of non-literal comparison to establish that the 
meaning of the phrase is something like "the unmarried 
girl". 
It is possible for the syntactic system to 
override the lexical system. 	The poetry of e e cummings 
frequently does this. 	In "Anyone Lived in a Happy How 
Town", the syntactic form is retained without a blemish,, 
whilst the lexical items slotted into it are unusual. 
It is the rules of the syntactic system which allow for 
a meaning to be derived. 	Another graphic example of this 
is "Jatberwo&ky'!, 	where the syntactic system and 
morphological system combine to override lexical items 
which are idiosyncratic phonological creations. 
Generally, it is far simpler to allow the 
meaning-based systems-- the lexical system, the sentence-
seMantic system, the discourse system—to override the 
more formal systems 	the syntactic, phonological and 
morphological—because the overall motivation for 
between-system creativity is the communicative intent. 
The meaning-based systems appear to adapt themselves 
more readily to implementing this intent. 
De Beaugrande's definition of creativity, takes 
into account that the process of meaning-creation is not 
confined to linguistic activities: it reflects two 
essential aspects of the process. 	Firstly, it points out 
that creativity is the reconstruction of a given reality. 
This implies that there must first be awareness of that 
reality, but also the awareness of the possibilities for 
changing that reality. 	In the case of language, the 
given realities are the systematic facts of language. 
Once they are perceived as a system of rules and elements, 
that knowledge can be exploited. 
Secondly, the definition emphasizes that the 
process must be a public process. 	Unless the derivation 
of the reconstructed reality is accessible to others, it 
remains an idiosyncratic construction, without public 
meaning and unlikely to be of lasting value. 	It will 
cease to exist when its creator ceases to - exist. 	Only 
if.the reconstruction of linguistic reality is accessible 
to others can it be considered as a creative thing. 
In the case of language, the creator therefore, still 
uses rules_, but in - new. ways. 	It is the overt derivation 
of this new use that allows for the creation to be made public. 
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The tension between private construction and public 
perception is part and parcel of the attraction which 
this fundamentally human activity of reconstructing 
and reinterpreting reality has for many individuals. 
5. Creativity and Language. 
What has been attempted in this chapter is a 
demonstration of how language is creative. 	That language 
is creative is patently obvious and 	has been commented 
upon by most theorists. And yet it has never been a 
formal part of linguistic description, except in the 
trivial sense of within-system creativity which is a 
formal function of any system based on rules and elements. 
Descriptions of language as creative have so far 
belonged to the"pious faithucategory of linguistic terminology. 
It is suggested that there is no reason why the creative 
aspect of language should not be formalised and taken 
beyond the mere description of certain phenomena as creative. 
Creativity is a formal aspect of a complex intersystem,where 
the rules and elements of each system are subject to 
modification in the light of the rules and elements of 
other systems. 
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Something like Wheatley's (1970) Overriding 
Rule still exists, but it has grown now into something 
close to an expression of the function of language: 
overall meaning or significance. Whenever a language 
user is faced with a linguistic signal, he approaches 
it with the intent of deriving meaning from it and 
determining its significance. 	That is the only aspect 
of the language process which is immutable. 
Here dgain we are reaching the limits of language 
and approaching the cognitive domain. 	Nevertheless, 
there is something essential in this junction between 
thought and language. 	We firmly expect people to be 
meaningful in their actions and their utterances. 
We do not expect people to make meaningless utterances, 
and we need to have sound evidence before we actually 
believe of anyone that his utterances are meaningless. 
If the meaningless patter of a severe schizophrenic is 
examined, then the natural temptation is to "read meaning 
into it". 
There is a vast range between the literally 
meaningful and the meaningless. 	This range is the inspiration . 
for wisdom, comedy, and beauty. 	It is made possible by the 
systematic nature of language,but uses this systematicity by 
breaking it. 	It is a vastly productive capacity made by 
language, but is not itself directly a part of language, 
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All the rules and elements of the system are 
subject to modification, thereby vastly increasing the 
expressive power of the system. 	Theoretically, it 
might be possible to specify all the modifications which 
are possible. 	However, the resultant figure would be 
meaninglessly large; and possibly indifinitely large 
because of the open-ended nature of some systems. 
This only points up once again the vast resources 
at the disposal of the language user, 	It is a matter of 
skill and talent that the creative language user can 
produce texts which exploit this resource, 	In one sense 
of the word, such texts are more meaningful (going further 
beyond the meaning capacity of the various systems) and 
therefore, more significant than normal every-day uses. 
Because of the public nature of the language resource, 
such creative language use is thoroughly interesting. 
It is, then, a matter for aesthetic assessment whether such 
usage is successful or not, 
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7. CONCLUSION.  
The discussion of creativity in language and, 
as a special case of this creativity, metaphor, has shown 
that any conception of language that is confined to an 
"elements-and-rules" description is unable to account for 
certain language phenomena. 	Only if language is seen as 
a system of various independent systems, can a reasonable 
explanation be made of phenomenon such as metaphor. 
This conclusion suggests that language is a far 
more complicated arrangement than the common linguistic 
view has suggested to date. 	By trying to include metaphor, 
and, more generally, creativity, in the description of 
language, we have possibly swapped Chomsky's mystery for 
a higher level of complexity. 
However, this new complexity is preferable to a 
description which, perforce, closes its eyes to some 
utterly common language phenomena such as metaphor. 
Further, this complexity can be properly -investigated and 
the properties of language which contribute to it can now 
be properly formalised. 
163 
In a way, this requires a breadth of linguistic 
expertise which runs against the grain of scientific 
specialisation. 	Linguistics has developed, and grown 
into a range of specialised inquiries, with few scholars 
acquainted with detailed knowledge outside their own area 
of expertise. 
Ultimately, it will be necessary for an eclectic 
effort of synthesis to be made. 	This is so because 
linguistics has a common objective for all its diverse 
inquiries: to understand language. 	Whilst any one 
particular inquiry may aim to understand only a small 
component of language, there is an unspoken acceptance 
that the ultimate aim is to understand the whole. 
Specialisation, therefore, has been accompanied 
by a trend to generalisation. 	This is represented by 
those researchers who constantly extend the boundaries of 
legitimate linguistic inquiry. 	In particular, text 
linguistics and discourse analysis have reviewed much of 
earlier linguistic research and put it into a broader 
context, 	The linguistics of the sentence has thus been 
incorporated into the linguistics of the text or of the 
utterance. 	These new perspectives have demanded a re- 
examination of earlier boundaries. 	Just as the Chomskian 
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revolution ended the disregarding of sentenceT ,meaning, 
so the text linguists and discourse analysts are ending 
the disregarding of meaning above the sentence, 	The 
structure and meaning of the sentence is no longer the 
beginning and end of linguistics, 
In a small way, this present study has tried 
to support this changing perspective. 	Creativity, in 
general, and metaphor, in particular, can only be approached 
by a linguistics that is cognisant of context and text. 
A structuralism based on the sentence can only dismiss 
metaphor as an aberration, 	A structuralism based on the 
text or the utterance accepts metaphor as a formal capacity 
of language. 
The formal nature of this capacity is crucial 
since otherwise it would be a trivial aspect of language, 
one that is not subject to precise description. 	A 
description is provided in this study. 	However, the extent 
to which this description is completely formal is questionable. 
This is so because any exhaustively formal description must 
awAit greater descriptive precision in the open-ended 
systems of language -- lexis, semantics, cognition. 
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Further, it is not at all certain what an 
exhaustively formal description of the creative capacity 
of language would be like. 	It is unlikely that a 
mathematical formula would be sufficient for such a 
description, since we are dealing with intersystem 
relations which are based on meaning. 	For a comparison, 
we may need to examine other meaning-based systems such 
as traffic signs, or flag signs. 	An unusual juxtaposition 
of two flags may, in certain contexts, produce an effect 
similar to metaphor. 
Therefore, this study assumes a preliminary nature. 
It is by no means definitive and aims only. to be suggestive. 
Further work in text linguistics seems to hold the key to 
whether the conception of language suggested here is useful 
or not. 	And that is beyond the scope of this study. 
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